Guide to Study of Intelligence

Intelligence in the Cold War

by Michael J. Sulick, Ph.D.

“Cold War” by definition is an intense conflict that stops short of full-scale war. In the Cold War between the US and USSR, the superpowers and their allies relied heavily on intelligence to avert a full-scale war, which, in the nuclear age, could have led to catastrophic destruction. Because of its prominent role, intelligence became a topic of heightened interest in popular culture, scholarly research and investigative journalism.

The secrecy shrouding intelligence operations and the varying reliability of sources has complicated the study of Cold War intelligence, but in the past two decades the publication of volumes of declassified material affords new opportunities for instructors and students. Works by intelligence officers on both sides provide first-hand accounts of high level policy deliberations as well as details of specific operations. More importantly, the continuing declassification of documents by the US and other governments now allow more informed research on Cold War period intelligence.

Documents of the CIA and other intelligence community agencies are available at the National Records and Archives Administration (NARA), the libraries of US Presidents during the Cold War, and various other websites such as the Wilson Center’s Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) and George Washington University’s National Security Archive.¹ The websites of US intelligence community agencies also include official organizational histories that cover the Cold War period. Documents from foreign archives, including those of the USSR and a Soviet bloc, are also available, a welcome development since most Cold War intelligence history has been written by westerners reliant on primarily western sources.

Considering the vast amount of material now available, this guide is but a starting point and touches briefly on some unique aspects that distinguish intelligence in the Cold War: the role of individual spies and western failures of counterintelligence; the significant impact of technology on intelligence; the substantial use of covert action by the superpowers; and intelligence analysis.

Spy vs. Spy

Most HUMINT, i.e. intelligence from human spies, is fragmentary, gleaned from a host of sources with varying degrees of access, and must be connected together like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle to clarify enemy capabilities and intentions. Few spies singlehandedly have a major impact on national security, but Cold War intelligence was characterized by some rare cases on both sides in which information from individual spies proved vital during crises or could have changed the balance of power.

Early in the Cold War, the superpowers were unevenly matched in espionage. The Soviet intelligence services, the KGB and GRU, inherited a spying tradition that dated back centuries.² Spying on one’s neighbors, colleagues and even family was as ingrained in the Russian soul as privacy rights and free speech are in America. The Soviets had thoroughly penetrated the US government in the 1930-40s and their acquisition of America’s atom bomb secrets leveled the superpower playing field at the outset of the Cold War.³ From the counterintelligence perspective, the Soviets guarded their secrets by pervasive monitoring of foreigners in the USSR, restricting foreign contact with its citizens, especially those with access to secrets, and recruiting spies in western intelligence services.

Except in wartime, the US had no institutions or expertise in intelligence collection or counterintelligence through most of its history. The US did not

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3. Recently released documents from the Mitrokhin archive include a list of about 1,000 KGB agents in the US over several decades. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/06/soviet-spy-secrets-kgb-documents_n_5562147.html.
establish a central authority to find spies until President Roosevelt, worried about looming involvement in a world war, assigned the task to the FBI in 1939. With the advent of the Cold War, the nation realized the need for a centralized intelligence capability and established the CIA in 1947. In spite of these efforts, the US would founder in its initial attempts to collect intelligence on the Soviet Union and would suffer serious counterintelligence failures from spies in its ranks throughout the Cold War.

The US may have been an easy intelligence target, but the British, French, West Germans and others were penetrated by the Soviets as well, sometimes at the top levels of government. Because of the close cooperation between the US and United Kingdom, Soviet spies in the UK were able to betray the secrets of both nations in the early days of the Cold War. In Berlin, one of the US’ first technical operations, the building of a tunnel to tap into Soviet military communications, was compromised by George Blake, a spy in British intelligence.

The Soviets and its allies failed to recruit spies at the top levels of the US government as they had in the 1930-1940s. As the Cold War progressed, however, they found American spies whose information could have drastically changed the precarious balance of power. Thanks to one Cold War spy, naval communications officer John Walker, the Soviets knew every move of America’s nuclear ballistic missile submarine fleet, which was considered the most invulnerable leg of the nation’s land, air and sea defense triad. As the director of naval intelligence noted, Walker’s betrayal could have had “war winning implications for the Soviet Union.” If the superpowers had only engaged in a conventional war in Europe, the Soviets would also have enjoyed a distinct advantage — a spy in the US Army, Sergeant Clyde Conrad, had given their surrogates, the Hungarian service, NATO’s complete defense plans for the continent. Even America’s intelligence and counterintelligence agencies were penetrated by the Soviets. Aldrich Ames, an officer in CIA’s Soviet Division, betrayed over twenty major spies along with other information about agency operations, and FBI agent Robert Hanssen compromised sources and a host of sensitive intelligence community operations.

The revelation after the Ames arrest that the CIA had over twenty sources inside the USSR was startling considering its difficulties in acquiring Soviet Bloc sources in the early days of the Cold War. Eventually the US acquired Soviet Bloc sources, some of whom singlehandedly provided information that had significant influence on foreign policy.

Among the first was Dmitriy Polyakov, who rose through the ranks to become a GRU major-general, the highest ranking spy the US ever had inside the Soviet government. Polyakov’s information on the increasing split between the Soviet Union and China played a critical role in President Nixon’s decision to open diplomatic relations with China in 1972. Adolph Tolkachev, an electronics engineer at a highly classified research institute, provided Soviet military secrets for over eight years that “saved the US billions of dollars in defense expenditures in the 1980s.” Ryszard Kuklinski, a Polish army colonel, kept the US apprised of plans to impose martial law in Poland in 1981 and Soviet deliberations to suppress rising opposition to the communist regime. US allies contributed their share of vital intelligence from Soviet spies. Perhaps the most significant of all was Oleg Penkovsky, a GRU colonel who passed to the CIA and British MI-6 manuals on Soviet missile systems that would play a critical role in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

Technical Intelligence

The unprecedented Twentieth Century advances in technology revolutionized intelligence and had an enormous impact on foreign policy. Penkovsky’s

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5. Recommended readings on British intelligence in general that include treatment of the “Cambridge Spy ring” referred to here are Keith Jeffery, The Secret History of MI-6: 1909-1949 (New York: Penguin, 2010) based on access to official archives of the foreign intelligence service, and Christopher Andrew, Defense of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI-5 (New York: Knopf, 2009), which in turn is based on the same access to the files of the internal security service.


8. Stuart Herrington: Spies Among Us: Inside the Spycatcher’s World. The unprecedented Twentieth Century advances in technology revolutionized intelligence and had an enormous impact on foreign policy. Penkovsky's
information, while crucial, was complemented by intelligence gleaned from new technical collection. The manuals Penkovskiy provided served to clarify imagery from reconnaissance flights over Cuba that indicated the construction of Soviet ballistic missile sites. The integration of HUMINT, overhead reconnaissance and NSA’s monitoring of communications confirmed Khrushchev’s maneuvering and ultimately prevented a nuclear confrontation.11

In the early days of the Cold War the US had few sources of information on Soviet strategic weapons capabilities. US aerial reconnaissance flights intercepted military communications and photographed military facilities but could only sniff around the edges of Soviet territory without risking being shot down. At President Eisenhower’s initiative, the CIA developed the U-2, a high altitude aircraft that could penetrate deep into Soviet territory.12 Eisenhower ended CIA U-2 overflights of the USSR in 1960 after the pilot, Francis Gary Powers, was shot down and paraded before the world media. The U-2 incident proved to be a major diplomatic embarrassment for Eisenhower, the first of many that US presidents would confront because of intelligence activities.

Despite the incident, the U-2 saved the US billions of dollars in unnecessary expenditures on bombers and missiles, located Soviet targets, mapped air defenses and provided the US with the ability to discount bluffs by Soviet leaders exaggerating the size and strength of their strategic arsenal. The U-2 shoot down was also unfortunate since the program was about to be replaced because of a significant development in aerial reconnaissance. The Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957 sparked a huge investment in scientific research, especially on space technology, and one of its most significant achievements was the Corona program that developed a photoreconnaissance capability from space.

The US reconnaissance satellite effort played a critical role in preventing nuclear war. Successive generations of spy satellites relayed photos back to earth in real time, especially useful in monitoring quick-developing crises around the globe, and produced increasingly higher resolution imagery for more accurate assessments of Soviet weapons capabilities. Developments in space communications led to similar advances in NSA’s monitoring capabilities.

Once the Soviets developed their own reconnaissance satellites, both sides dramatically increased their knowledge of each other’s arsenals. Overhead reconnaissance became an essential key to the conclusion of strategic arms treaties between the superpowers during the Cold War since imagery aided the superpowers’ ability to monitor compliance.

While overhead reconnaissance was the most important technological development of the Cold War, technological advances produced other innovative operations. In 1974 the CIA contracted the secret construction and deployment of the Glomar Explorer to salvage a sunken Soviet submarine from the Pacific Ocean floor. Sophisticated technology on the Glomar enabled the painstaking removal of sections of the submarine underwater, hidden from detection by aircraft or spy satellites.13

Covert Action

Throughout history, intelligence services have not only collected secrets but conducted other covert activities to further their nations’ interests. In the Cold War, these covert activities were essential instruments of Soviet policy to expand communism around the globe, and US policy to counter and reverse that expansion. These covert activities entailed a variety of measures, including disinformation, propaganda, psychological warfare, and the arming and support of governments or insurgent groups. The KGB dubbed such activities “active measures” while the US termed them “covert action.” activities run by the CIA to further US national interests while hiding the American hand. US policymakers viewed covert action as a middle option between diplomacy and military action, which might have escalated into a nuclear confrontation.14 Every US president sanctioned covert action to some degree, and the foreign policy legacies of many were tainted by those that failed.

At the outset of the Cold War, the Soviets used subversion as one of their tools to occupy Eastern

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Europe. US fears of Soviet encroachment in Western Europe prompted the use of covert influence to prevent a communist victory in the 1948 elections in Italy. Buoyed by this victory, the Eisenhower administration embraced covert action to overthrow the prime minister of Iran in 1953 and, a year later, the leftist leaning president of Guatemala.

The euphoria over covert action as a panacea to reverse Soviet expansion ended with the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961, the US covert action that is the most discussed in intelligence literature. Although covert action is intended to hide American involvement, information about the Cuban exiles' training leaked to the media, and Castro’s intelligence service also riddled the force with spies. The exiles were easily defeated and the operation caused another diplomatic embarrassment for the US.15

The Bay of Pigs did not deter future presidents from resorting to covert action. Many of the most publicized operations tarnished the reputations of the presidents and the US's image at home and abroad. During the Johnson administration, the CIA's involvement in Operation Phoenix in Vietnam, a counterinsurgency program to root out the Vietcong, was reviled when revelations surfaced about South Vietnamese indiscriminate torture and assassination. President Nixon's covert attempts to unseat Chile's Marxist leader, Salvador Allende, also failed and were denounced as proof of the US' imperialist ambitions. Covert action survived intense Congressional scrutiny of intelligence community activities in the mid-1970s. An internal CIA report compiled a litany of agency violations of its charter, including illegal wire-tapping and surveillance of American citizens, human experimentation with hallucinogens, and involvement in plots to assassinate foreign leaders. Both houses of Congress formed special committees to review the full range of activities by the CIA and other agencies, which led to the establishment of permanent Congressional committees on intelligence.16

Although presidents still employed covert action, an emboldened Congress began to exercise a more direct role. In 1982, Congress defunded President Reagan's program to overthrow the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Reagan's CIA director William Casey and others circumvented the ban by facilitating the sale of arms to Iran in exchange for western hostages and used the proceeds to fund the Nicaraguan rebels. The secret deal eventually surfaced and led to various investigations and a black eye for the administration.17

While many covert action programs were criticized as failures, some were judged more positively. As one example, another Reagan era covert action program dealt one of the final blows to the Soviets' dream of worldwide communism and to the USSR itself. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 to ensure the survival of a friendly communist regime was confronted with increasing resistance by the “mujaheddin,” multi-national Moslem insurgent groups. Reagan's provision of arms and funding to the mujaheddin, particularly the “Stinger,” an advanced portable anti-aircraft missile, ultimately contributed to forcing the Soviet withdrawal.

Ironically, most publicity and most studies of US Cold War intelligence focus on CIA's covert action more than its primary role of producing intelligence. Despite the volumes written on CIA covert action, most of them harshly critical, there is still a rich mine of history to come for the student of Cold War intelligence. The passage of time and declassification of government documents has led in some cases to more dispassionate re-examination of the programs. In recent years, scholars have suggested that internal political dynamics played a more important role in the Iran coup of 1953 than the CIA, a key point since US involvement has been touted as a cause of the Islamic regime's current anti-Americanism.18 Similarly, assessments of Operation Phoenix have been tempered by extensive document declassification and an internal history of the CIA's role in Vietnam.19 Release of documents on the Chile covert action has also prompted scholars to reconsider some aspects of

16. See the report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (known as the "Church Committee") at www.intelligence.senate.gov/churchcommittee.html. Also see Gerald Haines’ article about the unauthorized publication of the House’s parallel investigation at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/winter98_99/art07.html. The internal CIA report on unauthorized activities is available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/family_jewels_full.pdf.
the Nixon administration’s program to oust Allende.20

Intelligence Analysis

The sophistication of intelligence analysis, primarily in US and Western services, developed significantly during the Cold War. Analysts became more adept at integrating information from all available sources — human spies, technical intelligence and overt sources. A new phenomenon that emerged during the Cold War was intense public debate over intelligence estimates.

The analyst’s goal is to present the most objective assessment to aid policymakers’ decisions. Maintaining objectivity became a daunting challenge during the Cold War when estimates were often publicly praised or vilified in partisan political debate. Bureaucratic politics also affected estimates as different agencies would base their own analysis on the equities of their institution.

The priority task of intelligence during the Cold War was warning of potential military confrontation with the Soviet Union, and thus the assessment of Soviet strategic weapon capabilities and intentions became the most controversial topic of US intelligence analyses.21 In the early decades of the Cold War, the US military raised alarms that the Soviets were surpassing the US in those capabilities to justify budget requests for additional weaponry. The specter of a “bomber gap” and then a “missile gap” fueled increased defense spending despite CIA analyses that disagreed with the military’s more alarming estimate.

The issue also illustrated the impact of intelligence analysis on US domestic politics throughout the Cold War. In his 1960 presidential campaign, Kennedy exploited the supposed bomber gap to attack the Republicans as weak on national security. Eventually the advent of overhead reconnaissance led to more accurate assessments that showed the gaps did not exist. The debate on Soviet military capabilities, however, continued throughout the rest of the Cold War.

During the Vietnam conflict, CIA analysts were also at odds with the military as well as with the Johnson administration. Pessimistic about the President’s bombing of North Vietnam, CIA argued that the campaign would not reduce the will or ability of the communists to fight on. CIA analysts also disputed military estimates of North Vietnamese troop strength and were proved right by the 1968 massive Tet Offensive.22

In the 1970s the military, supported by hawkish Republicans, again argued that CIA analysts were underestimating the Soviet threat. In 1976 then CIA director George H. W. Bush assembled a “Team A” of CIA analysts and “Team B,” outside experts in three specific areas, to conduct a competitive analysis of the topic. The Team B experts working on Soviet strategic objectives were firmly convinced that the Soviets would do anything, even engage in nuclear war, to achieve world hegemony. The hardliners’ assessment was leaked to the media, and the CIA was pressed to reflect the more hawkish views in its estimate.

Some critics believe the CIA and the entire intelligence community were blindsided by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Senior CIA officials have admitted that analysts were slow to realize the imminent collapse but note that they were alerting policymakers for years about the stagnating Soviet economy.23 Also, from early 1989 the CIA had been warning policymakers of a festering crisis brewing in the USSR because of its increasingly declining economy.

The Soviet Union itself was blind to its own deteriorating situation. That blindness was also evident in its intelligence analysis. Based on defector Vasili Mitrokhin’s information, British scholar Christopher Andrew noted that Soviet intelligence analysis was always poor in contrast to their collection of secrets from spies.24 While a certain amount of politicization enters assessments in Western intelligence services, it was endemic in the KGB, which tailored its analysis to endorse the regime’s policies. Gorbachev mandated more objective assessments once he came to power, but by then it was too late for the KGB’s ingrained culture of communist political correctness to overcome old habits. As in the past, KGB assessments, such as they were, blamed Soviet policy failures on the evil machinations of the West.

Conclusion

Markus Wolf, East Germany’s notorious intelligence chief during the Cold War, claimed in his mem-

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22. Sam Adams, War of Numbers: an Intelligence Memoir (South Royalton VT: Steerforth Press, 1994). Adams was the CIA analyst who developed the controversial estimate.
oirs that “the intelligence services contributed to a half century of peace... by giving statesmen some security that they would not be surprised by the other side.”

While Wolf’s comments are undoubtedly self-serving, other also believe that intelligence ultimately provided the superpowers with the knowledge and confidence to avoid a devastating nuclear war. The contribution of intelligence, its successes, failures, costs and consequences, are still debatable, and the continuing release of new archival material will afford students of the Cold War with increasing opportunities to examine a host of issues in the conflict that shaped the world order for over four decades.

**Readings for Instructors**

Christopher Andrew, *For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (New York: Harper perennial, 1995). Andrew’s study, which focuses primarily on the Cold War, is the most comprehensive treatment of the role of intelligence in presidential decision-making.

Benjamin Weiser, *A Secret Life* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004) is the story of Polish Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski. Based partly on access to CIA files and the officers involved, the book provides an excellent introduction to the tradecraft used to keep spies safe and the psychological strains of espionage.

Jeanne Vertefeuille and Sandra Grimes, *Circle of Treason: A CIA Account of Traitor Aldrich Ames and the Men He Betrayed* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2012). The authors were directly involved in the hunt for a Soviet mole and the unmasking of Ames, the most notable CIA spy of the Cold War. The book not only illustrates the difficulties of espionage investigations and the damage caused by spies but also provides the best account of Dmitriy Polyakov, one of those betrayed by Ames and the highest ranking Soviet spy of the Cold War.

Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievskiy, *The KGB: the Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev* (London: Sceptre, 1991). Christopher Andrew and Vasilli Mitrokhin, *The Sword and the Shield: the Mitrokhin Archives and the History of the KGB* (New York: Basic Books, 1999). Russia’s declassification of Cold War intelligence documents is meager compared to that of western governments but these two books more than compensate. Gordievskiy was a senior KGB officer who spied for British intelligence; Mitrokhin was a KGB archivist who smuggled out voluminous KGB files and defected to British intelligence.

Bob Wallace and Keith Melton, *Spycraft: the Secret History of CIA Spytechs from Communism to Al Qaeda* (New York: Dutton, 2008). While this book only deals tangentially with major technical developments such as overhead reconnaissance and electronic eavesdropping, it is the most comprehensive and detailed study of technical support to spy tradecraft.

Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce, eds., *Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles and Innovations* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008). Understanding the debate on US estimates during the Cold War requires knowledge of the unique challenges faced by analysts and this study is one of the best introductions for the student.

A career intelligence officer, Michael Sulick was Director of CIA’s National Clandestine Service (2007-2010) responsible for managing global covert operations on major threats to national security. He was also chief of CIA counterintelligence (2002-2004). Since his retirement, he has written *Spying in America* and *American Spies*, a two-volume history on Americans spying against the US from the Revolutionary War to the present. He currently serves of the board of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers.

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“It will make you a man. It’ll destroy you. It’ll make you an animal. It’ll turn you into a monster. It will make you sadder but wiser for the rest of your days. You’ve touched the heart of darkness. In fact, it’s a complicated mix of an incredible range of experiences.”

— Phil Klay, U.S. Marine Corps veteran on impact of being in war, in *Redeployment* [Penguin, March 2014]

“...we have broken the china and are now in a rush to flee the shop, while carefully forged alliances are unraveling and supposed allies are casting their eyes in other directions for friends.”

— Robert L. Grenier, former CIA Officer, in *88 Days to Kandahar: A CIA Diary* [Simon & Schuster, 1/2015]
After the end of World War II, all the Western allies began a rapid drawdown of military forces, including those of signals intelligence. At the time, the US still had a COMINT organization split between the Army and Navy. A 1946 plan listed Russia, China, and a [redacted] country as high-priority targets. Each service ran independent agreements with foreign counterparts, some of which, especially the British, had already formed a central communications intelligence organization. This paper asserts that Cold War intelligence was essentially military intelligence. It provides a personal perspective on the UK Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) and how Cold War intelligence was influenced by the experiences of individuals in the Second World War. It reviews little-studied aspects of the US–UK intelligence relationship, the NATO intelligence dimension, and the British Commanders’-in-Chief Mission to the Soviet Forces in (East) Germany (BRIXMIS), effectively legitimate spies in uniform. The end of the Cold War, and subsequent reduction in arms accumulation, has not brought about the expected boost to the world economy. The decline in spending of many NATO members will be gradual, the results of which will not be seen until the middle of the decade.