HANS KELSEN’S THEORY AND THE KEY TO HIS NORMATIVIST DIMENSION

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I  INTRODUCTION

Writers have both praised and criticised Hans Kelsen’s work, however all would agree that he is ‘a theorist to be reckoned with.’ The focus of this research paper is to critically examine whether the key to the normative dimension of Kelsen’s ‘Pure Theory of Law’, first published in his book of the same name in 1934, is a neo-Kantian or regressive version of Kant’s transcendental argument. This paper will begin by outlining Kelsen’s theory and discuss the ‘middle-way’ approach he adopts between the traditional theories of natural law and legal positivism. This paper will then outline Kant’s transcendental argument and apply the dimensions of Kelsen’s neo-Kantian or regressive version to this argument. This paper will demonstrate how Kelsen’s system of basic norms apply to Kant’s transcendental argument and conclude with a statement as to the problems inherent in Kelsen’s application of the neo-Kantian or regressive version of Kant’s theory.

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2 Ibid.
II  KELENS’S PURE THEORY OF LAW

Paulson states that ‘Kelsen would have his Pure Theory of Law understood as a theory of legal cognition, of legal knowledge’ and that ‘the sole aim of the Pure Theory is cognition or knowledge of its object, precisely specified as the law itself.’ Kelsen believed that utilising ‘alien’ disciplines such as ethics, theology, psychology and biology to answer legal questions have led legal theorists astray and hence his ‘pure’ theory of law must be sharply distinguished. Kelsen wished to create a ‘science of law’ which ought to be ‘distinguished from the philosophy of justice on the one hand and from sociology, or the cognition of social reality, on the other.’ Thus Kelsen’s pure theory ‘provides the basic forms under which meanings can be known scientifically as legal norms.’ These legal norms form a ‘normative system’ which requires that individuals conform to the modes of behaviour stated in each of these norms, ie an ‘ought’ proposition. This normative system is expressed in a hierarchical structure where the validity of a legal norm is inferred from a higher order norm, whose validity is thus derived from an even higher order norm and so on until it reaches the highest order norm, through a direct appeal to the Constitution, which is the source of the validity of all the derivative norms, ie the Grundnorm or ‘origin-norm.’ The premise on which Kelsen bases this validity has been the subject of much

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3  Ibid 313.
4  Ibid.
6  Michael Freeman, Introduction to Jurisprudence (Sweet & Maxwell, 8th ed, 2008) 307 quoted in Zimmermann, above n 5, 73.
discussion and criticism, particularly by his main intellectual opponent, Carl Schmitt, who mockingly comments that a legal norm is ‘valid if it is valid and because it is valid.’  

Kelsen’s validity theory and its transcendental application will be discussed further below.

Kelsen distinguishes his pure theory of law from both traditional natural law theory and traditional legal positivism, and instead identifies his theory as a ‘middle-way’ between the two traditional theories. Historically, natural law theory is subject to moral constraints while empirico-positivist theory is seen as part of the world of fact. Kelsen rejects both theories, stating that neither are defensible and thus produces his alternative theory of pure law, one which is free from the ‘foreign elements’ of either theory, ie matters of morality and matters of fact.

Pure Theory of Law is Kelsen’s attempt to combine the separability of law and morality (or ‘separation thesis’) with the separability of law and fact (or ‘normativity thesis’). The separation thesis is the usual domain of legal positivism and the normativity thesis reflects a classical part of natural law theory, hence the combination of both theses effectively adopts a Kantian or neo-Kantian middle-way or, as Kelsen put it mittelweg, between the two theories. Kelsen’s alternative theory, however, is not a reflection of Kant’s moral or legal philosophy as, in fact, Kelsen saw himself as a champion of legal positivism, but rather

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11 Ibid 314.
Kant’s ability to develop a ‘middle-way’ in his transcendental argument,\(^{15}\) to which this paper will now turn.

## III Kant’s Transcendental Argument

Kant is known for retaining some of the terminology of the medieval transcendents, while rejecting the general features of the classification,\(^{16}\) such as his disregard for God-given natural law in his formulaic development of the ‘categorical imperative.’\(^{17}\) Instead, Kant uses ‘transcendental’ to identify the conditions of possible cognition.\(^{18}\) In *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant writes that he is using the term to speak of cognition or knowledge that is concerned ‘not so much with the objects of cognition as with how we cognise objects, insofar as this may be possible *a priori*.\(^{19}\) Kant refers to the study of *a priori* knowledge as transcendental metaphysics.\(^{20}\) Thus Kant’s transcendental argument asks how such knowledge or cognition is possible.\(^{21}\) Similarly, Kelsen retains something of the terminology of fundamental norms, through his basic norm (*Grundnorm*), but rejects the import of the norms as they are

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\(^{17}\) Zimmermann, above n 5, 36. For a discussion of Kant’s formula of universal law and moral duty (ie the ‘categorical imperative’ or ‘ought’ proposition) see Patricia Kitcher, ‘Kant’s Argument for the Categorical Imperative’ (2004) 38 *NOÛS* 555.


\(^{19}\) Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (Norman Kemp Smith trans, Macmillan, 1929) [trans of: *Critic der Reinen Bearnunft* (first published 1781)] B25 quoted in Paulson, above n 1, 323; Paulson, above n 13, 283.


understood in the traditional sense, ie from a moral standpoint.\textsuperscript{22} Thus, Kelsen utilises Kant’s metaphysical, or abstract, transcendental argument of legal cognition on which to base his theory of the fundamental, or basic norm. It is important to note here, as Paulson does,\textsuperscript{23} that Kelsen makes it clear that his theory does not follow the progressive version of Kant’s transcendental argument, but rather the regressive or neo-Kantian version. The following is an explanation of this premise.

IV  NEO-KANTIAN OR REGRESSIVE DIMENSIONS OF KELSEN’S THEORY

In \textit{Pure Theory of Law} Kelsen clearly dissociates his theory with a progressive version of Kant’s transcendental argument by stating that ‘... the Pure Theory is well aware that one cannot prove the existence of the law as one proves the existence of natural material facts and the natural laws governing them ...’\textsuperscript{24} Instead, Kelsen relies on the neo-Kantian or regressive version which takes, as its starting point, the assumption that one \textit{already has} the knowledge or cognition of legal propositions.\textsuperscript{25} In his later works, Kelsen explains this concept by stating that

\begin{quote}
[o]ne can distinguish between lawful and unlawful command acts and objectively interpret interpersonal relations as legal relations,
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{23} See ibid; Paulson, ‘On the Puzzle Surrounding Hans Kelsen’s Basic Norm’, above n 13, 283, 287.
\item\textsuperscript{25} Paulson, ‘On the Puzzle Surrounding Hans Kelsen’s Basic Norm’, above n 13, 284.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
specifically, as legal duties, rights, and powers, only if one presupposes the basic norm ...

As an illustration of this point, Paulson outlines Kelsen’s regressive version of the transcendental argument in three phases; starting with a person’s cognition of legal norms (which is given), then ensuring that the cognition of legal norms is possible only if the category of normative imputation is presupposed (ie the transcendental premise) and thus concluding, therefore, that the category of normative imputation is presupposed (ie the transcendental conclusion). Kelsen compares the category of imputation with causation, stating that the ‘...laws of nature link a certain material fact as cause with another as effect [ie causation], so [do] positive laws link legal condition with legal consequence [ie imputation] ...’ Thus, Kelsen interprets Kant’s transcendental argument in the same way as the neo-Kantians, that is in a backward or regressive sense – from a theory that is already cognised (given) to the presupposed category or principle.

V Kelsen’s Basic Norm and the Neo-Kantian or Regressive Transcendental Argument

According to Scheuerman, ‘Kelsen’s theory represented the most important mid-twentieth-century effort to construct an identifiably neo-

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Kantian legal theory.

Kelsen’s characteristically neo-Kantian delineation of *Sein* (is) from *Sollen* (ought) formed the basis of his middle-way approach (discussed above) whilst, at the same time, distinguished his system of norms from any discussions of morality, ethics and questions of substantive justice. This distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ helped establish, inter alia, the validity of Kelsen’s legal norms. As has been addressed above, Kelsen’s system of norms formed a hierarchical structure whereby the validity of the basic norm is simply assumed, which is unsatisfactory as it does not answer the question as to why the norm is valid. Kelsen, himself, does not provide any clarification within his work, but could argue that Kant’s universal ‘categorical imperative’ to obey authority is justification enough of the validity of the basic norm.

Paulson states that to understand the validity of Kelsen’s basic norm, the neo-Kantian or regressive version of Kant’s transcendental argument must be implicit in the basic norm. Hence, where Kelsen introduces his notion of normative imputation as his fundamental category, he implicitly introduces a transcendental argument to demonstrate this fundamental category as a presupposition. Kelsen describes the basic norm as a ‘transcendental-logical presupposition’


31 Ibid.


which enables the scientific study of the objective validity of his legal system of norms.\(^{36}\)

Therefore, in general, the issuance of legal norms, compliance with them, and their application of sanctions for non-compliance is possible only if the fundamental legal category of imputation is presupposed.\(^{37}\) Paulson holds that no matter how Kelsen’s neo-Kantian argument on behalf of the fundamental legal category is formulated or constructed, it still remains problematic.\(^{38}\) The main problem being that the second premise of the three-phase argument outlined above claims too much in that the only way to support a normativist legal theory were by way of the category of imputation.\(^{39}\) Kantians would argue though that ruling out all possible alternatives to Kelsen’s category of normative imputation is tantamount to the \textit{progressive} version of the transcendental argument; an argument which Kelsen did not have in mind when developing his theory.\(^{40}\)

Therein lies the problem because it appears that, as Kelsen had no intention of using the progressive version, he is using the regressive version independently of the progressive version which robs it of its transcendental force.\(^{41}\) Where the transcendental element is lost, the regressive version thus reverts to a scheme of analysis or, more simply, as a \textit{legal point of view}.\(^{42}\) These problems aside, Paulson still maintains that

\(^{36}\) Kalyvas, above n 8, 575.


\(^{40}\) Ibid.

\(^{41}\) Ibid.

\(^{42}\) Ibid 332.
Kelsen’s neo-Kantian foundation of his legal theory is work that counts as one of the most provocative efforts of our time in coming to terms with the perennial problems of legal philosophy.\textsuperscript{43}

VI CONCLUSION

Kelsen based his pure theory of law, not on sociological considerations, but on the strict science of law itself. His pure theory reflects Kant’s transcendental argument on legal cognition without adopting Kant’s moral or legal philosophy. In applying the transcendental argument, Kelsen adopts a neo-Kantian or regressive version of Kant’s theory which assumes that one already has knowledge or cognition of legal propositions. This assumption forms the basis of the validity of Kelsen’s system of norms, supported by the presupposition of the category of normative imputation, ie the link between legal condition and legal consequence. As his critics point out, Kelsen does not provide clarification as to why these norms are valid, but relies instead on his ‘ought’ proposition (acting as a categorical imperative to obey authority) to justify the validity of the basic or ultimate norm. Although Kelsen’s theory is viewed by some as problematic, it is still considered among many as important work in the field of legal philosophy.

\textsuperscript{43} Paulson, ‘Hans Kelsen’s Earliest Legal Theory: Critical Constructivism’, above n 37, 812.
In that book, obviously not dedicated to Kelsen. I nonetheless referred to his theses several times. I analysed the work of two of Kelsen's followers. Felix Kanfmann and Fritz Schreier, who had endeavoured to reconcile the criticism of the Marburg school with phenomenology. Otherwise, we risk celebrating the victory of private particularism over the dimension of the public sphere, of surrendering without defence to the logic of the market. And I fear that were that to happen, and perhaps it is already happening, what would triumph would not be the freedom of all, but the war of all against all. D.Z. I should now like to bring in the theme of your relationships with Kelsen's work in connection with the theory of the international legal order and the problem of peace. Hans Kelsen's Normativist Reductionism. Article in Ratio Juris 21(2) · May 2008 with 50 Reads. How we measure 'reads'. This paper discusses Kelsen's attempt at reducing the concept of subjektives Recht (what is subjectively right) to that of objektives Recht (what is objectively right). This attempt fails, it is argued, because in Kelsen's theory the concept of subjektives Recht survives concealed within the concept of individual norm (individuelle Norm), a norm that, pace Kelsen, is not a case of what is objectively right (objektives Recht) but is precisely what is subjectively right (subjektives Recht): We could call it what is individually right.