

Dr Europe does not exist.
Roles played by EU committee chairs at the Commons
and at the French National Assembly.

by

Olivier Rozenberg

Cevipof – Centre de recherches politiques de Sciences Po (Paris)

FNSP – Fondation nationale des sciences politiques (France)

olivier.rozenberg@sciences-po.fr

Paper prepared for presentation at the 2008 ECPR Joint Session of Workshops
Workshop 13 “Parliamentary and Representative Roles in Modern Legislatures”
Rennes, France, April 2008

Legislative studies implicitly depict parliamentary roles as a factor of stability. Following Donald Searing's motivational approach developed in *Westminster's World* (1994), this paper tries to demonstrate that legislative roles usually contribute to the inertia of institutions but that they may on some occasions play a key role for the incremental change of legislatures. This process is driven by the need for maximisation of MPs psychological incentives rather than the achievement of rational strategies. The involvement of two European legislatures in the control of European Union (EU) affairs is analysed in order to establish the demonstration. The EU has brought about new constraints and new prerogatives for national parliaments. Some procedures and structures have been created in order to cope with the loss of control of national parliaments over the European legislative process (O'Brennan, Raunio, 2007; Tans, Zoethout, Peters, 2007; Costa, Rozenberg, t.b.p.). All over Europe, national chambers have notably created EU committees in charge of sifting through and of scrutinising community projects on legislation and on the monitoring of their government's European policy. These new EU committees have ushered in specialised tasks, procedures and prerogatives for their members which raises the possibility that belonging to such a committee would be a way to be "identified and placed" in the house. In other words, a new parliamentary role or sub-role associated with European activities could have emerged.

After a first theoretical section, the paper will focus on interviews conducted with successive chairs of the EU Committee at the House of Commons and at the French National Assembly which indicate that some MPs actually present themselves as experts on the EU (2). However, this role of "Dr Europe" does not exist as a real, coherent and cohesive parliamentary role. This is understood to be the result of a lack of gratification associated with European parliamentary scrutiny and confirms the contribution of roles to the inertia of institutions (3). However, a closer study of EU committee chairs leads to the conclusion that they play and adapt distinctive pre-existing parliamentary roles which can be called: the Chair (4), the Club Member (5), the Inquisitor (6), the Status Seeker (7). By playing those roles, the chairs contribute to their evolution which illustrates the capacity of roles to drive incremental change.

The two chairmanships of the EU committee at the House of Commons and at the National Assembly have been studied in order to develop more generalised conclusions. Indeed, the comparison aims at going beyond the descriptive and particularistic aspect of some comprehensive and qualitative studies of legislative roles. This comparison of the chairs is based on the proximity of the two cases. The French National Assembly and the House of Commons are close to each other from a macro-institutional point of view – in short, both are

weak¹ – but also as concerns their participation to the scrutiny of EU affairs which is usually regarded as moderate even if significant resources have been given to it².

1. Theorizing roles as factors for incremental changes

In his attempt to theorise the motivational approach to parliamentary roles, Searing writes somehow provocatively: “I have suggested that role theory is not a theory” (1994: 7). His main reason for contesting the theoretical quality of role-based approaches is their diversity. It is indeed true that, “there are, in short, no general role theories” (ibid) since there is no single conception of what a role is but rather a “conceptual confusion” among the social sciences and even within the single field of legislative studies. Another reason which might explain the difficulty in building a convincing theory from the role-based approach is the structural contradiction between roles and change. If the social sciences’ most convincing theories tend to propose a general account both for states of continuity and for states of change, then it appears that the concept of role is better able to describe continuity than change. Since most of the theories regard parliamentary roles as “routines that legislators adopt” (Strøm, 1997: 155) it is difficult to theorise the impact of roles when routines evolve or are broken. R. Turner’s definition of role (1992: 1681), quoted by Thomas Saalfeld and Wolfgang Müller (1997: 2) expresses this idea of continuity since he conceives a role, among other elements, as “a strategy for coping with a *recurrent* type of situation”.

Actually, the different approaches to parliamentary roles share this difficulty in conceptualising the part roles play in a process of change. Elaborating on Searing’s (1991) and Saalfeld and Müller’s (1997) works, four conceptions of roles may be distinguished. Firstly, the structural approach, associated with John Wahkle’s and his colleagues’ classical study (1962), emphasizes the functions performed by parliamentary institutions. In that respect, roles may evolve with the main functions of legislatures, that is, in a very incremental way. Thus, as concerns European democracies, the *trustees* of the 19th century have been

¹ Of course, such assertion would require longer developments. Westminster can be regarded as particularly weak as the UK is the closer political system to the majoritarian ideal type (Lijphart, 1999). French rationalised (Huber, 1996) parliament is also considered as particularly weak due to the legitimacy, authority and prerogatives of a direct elected President (Woldendorp, Keman, Budge, 2000). Comparative institutional studies largely agree on classifying both legislatures among the most dominated of Western Europe on the ground of the late and reduced institutionalisation of their committees system and of the executive control over the order of the day of the plenary session (Döring, 1995; Norton, 1998).

² For a comparison of national legislatures: Bergman, 2000; Maurer, Wessels, 2001; Raunio, Wiberg, 2000; Raunio, 2005. For a case study of the Europeanisation of the British Parliament: Cygan, 1998; Carter, 2001; Cygan, 2007a and b. For a case study of the Europeanisation of the French Parliament: Szukala, Rozenberg, 2001; Sprungk, 2007. And for a legal comparison of the two parliaments: Saulnier, 2002.

replaced by party *delegates*, to use Hannah Pitkin's famous distinction (1967). Secondly, the interactional approach focuses, on the contrary, on the creation of roles from a variety of social situations, emphasising the individual meaning given to them. This approach offers a more fluid conception of the roles (see for instance Fenno, 1978). Still, it does not attribute a particular place to roles in the process of change. In the "sociologistic cages" (Searing, 1994: 10) of interactional approaches, roles change when the interaction evolves but they are not a driving force for change. Thirdly, the motivational approach developed by D. Searing drawing on various previous works (notably Matthews, 1960) stresses MPs "career goals" and their "emotional incentives" when choosing and playing a single role rather exclusively. Therefore, changes in career goals or in incentives should provoke a change in the role played. But such events occur only a few times within a parliamentary career since emotional incentives are remarkably stable. Thus, *Ministerial aspirants* may start to behave like *Parliament men/women* when they discover that they no longer have any chance of being selected within the cabinet. However, given the scarcity of such adjustment, Searing's repertoire of roles appears as stable over time and hence this approach does not seek to explain how roles evolve or resist change within a legislature. Lastly, Kaare Strøm's more recent attempt to build a "neo-institutional rational choice" (1997: 156) approach to parliamentary roles depicts them as "strategies for the commitment of scarce resources" (157). Those strategies are driven by the MPs' objectives and framed by their institutional environment. If that environment is rather stable within legislatures, changes in the roles played would derive from changes to the parliamentarian's utility function. As rational choice approaches share the idea that this function is exogenous to political interactions, then playing a role does not appear as a key element in the process of change. Roles should follow the evolution of goals without interfering with them.

By omitting to elaborate more on the process of change, those various approaches tend implicitly to defend a conception of roles as a factor of resistance to change. This conception should be made more explicit so that one can determine whether this property can be regarded as a characteristic dimension of roles - as is the case for "identifying and placing persons in society" (Turner, 1992: 1681). The two following sections of the paper will confirm that the repertoires of roles are stable and that such stability can explain the inertia of institutions. It will indeed be considered that the attempt of some backbencher entrepreneurs to create a new parliamentary role specialised in EU affairs has largely failed. This failure explains why EU activities of both assemblies are regarded as rather moderate despite the resources devoted to

them. In that sense, the failure of the role of “Dr Europe” expresses the House of Commons’ and the National Assembly’s resistance to change.

However, the trouble is that roles actually do change. *Constituent Members* for instance have existed for ages at the House of Commons. But the number of Constituent MPs as well as the way of playing this role has considerably evolved since Searing studied them in the early ’70s (Cain, Ferejhon, Fiorina, 1987). Regarding the parliamentary participation to EU affairs, national parliaments have slowly but surely evolved since Maastricht. About a dozen of backbenchers now spend weekly a couple of hours in each assembly discussing community documents. In that last example, a purely rational perspective cannot give a satisfactory account for the observed changes. MPs’ interest to scrutinize EU documents is dramatically reduced – be them vote, office or party seekers (Saalfeld, 2005). Another explanation should thus be found. Intuitively, roles appear as a key phenomenon for incremental changes within institutions. Institutions change slowly because professional roles within them do so, and more exactly, because the ways of playing them evolve gradually. Following Searing’s motivational approach and also James Payne’s and his colleagues’ psychological analysis of politicians (1986), the hypothesis is developed here that roles encourage incremental changes. Three aspects can be distinguished:

1. Roles can change because they are played. Even if “a script is already written [...and] expectations are established” (Searing, 1994: 428), roles are different from institutional constraints precisely because their “prescriptions” (Giddens, 1979: 117) are interiorised, selected, translated and eventually transformed by actors.
2. Roles do change because “the principal energizing forces in all parliamentary roles” (Searing, 1994: 19) are emotions. Emotional gratification are simply defined as the pleasure received by the politicians. Politicians tend to be animated by a single emotional drive (Payne, 1986)³ and by the will to maximize it. When an external change occurs – be it procedural innovation, constitutional reform or technologic change – MPs tend to adapt to this new situation in a way that would maximise their immediate pleasure. In so doing, they tend to modify the way they present themselves to others and the way they are identified. In other words, emotional incentives produce roles change.

³ This point is crucial since it is used within the motivational approach in order to explain why an MP tends to play one role rather than several. It largely derives from numerous convergent empirical observations (Payne but also Searing) without being really explained. Indeed, the question of why the emotional drive is rather unique still does not have found a satisfactory answer. Payne’s intuition is rather Darwinian: since “politics is not a cushy, comfortable occupation” (Payne, 1986: 1), those who are eventually successful are the most motivated and the most motivated reacts to a single emotional incentive. Even if this explanation is far from being satisfactory, it may be difficult to go further on this complex psychological field with the only tools of political science.

3. Changes of an institution are incremental rather than brutal because they are mediated by roles. Roles change slowly because they tend to institutionalise past habits and norms but also psychological expectations that are remarkably stable throughout a lifetime.

Roles contribution to institutional incremental changes will be considered in the second half of the paper by linking the attitudes and behaviour of the last EU committee chairs to previous parliamentary roles. By playing former roles rather than new ones, these chairs eventually participate to the incremental Europeanisation of the two houses. Most important, the chairs' favourite roles contribute to spread a vision of what Europe is about and what should be the place of national parliaments within the EU.

2. The institutionalisation of EU committee Chairs

In 1974, the House of Commons was among the first national chambers to create a Select Committee on European Community Secondary Legislation, now called the European Scrutiny Committee (ESC). In 1979 in France, each assembly created a kind of committee called a *Délégation*, with the Delegation for EU. The two structures are first and foremost in charge of scrutinising the thousand documents produced yearly by the EU. Among them projects on community legislation are of primary importance since those norms are integrated into the national legal order after the agreement of the Council and of the European Parliament. The ESC is in charge particularly of identifying projects of "legal and political importance" which will then be considered by one of the European Standing Committees. In France in 1992, each assembly of the French Parliament was allowed to enact non-binding opinions about those projects, called resolutions. Those resolutions are then adopted by one of six committees (or by the floor) but they are prepared by each Delegation. Lastly, the UK and then France have established a system of parliamentary scrutiny reserve according to which ministers commit themselves not to take position on a given project within the Council as long as parliamentary scrutiny is still going on. In practical terms, the ESC and the Delegation are in charge of relations with national administrations in the management of this scrutiny reserve.

During the '90s the ESC and the National Assembly Delegation experienced a rather similar process of institutionalisation with the development of both their legal prerogatives and their human resources – each committee counting about fifteen civil servants. The ESC chair and the president of the Delegation have significant responsibility in the management of the two structures. They chair the weekly meetings. They manage the team of civil servants.

They decide or contribute to decisions on whether a document is cleared - which means that the cabinet could raise the scrutiny reserve – or whether the house requires more information from the administration. By sharing their power and by chairing the meetings, they have a decisive influence on the way the members of the committee participate in the scrutiny. The sixteen members of the ESC and the thirty-six members of the Delegation choose their chair among them after the general election. Table 1 indicates the list of the chairs for the ESC and for the National Assembly Delegation and the French Senate. Until 1997, the ESC chair belonged to the parliamentary opposition. Since then, the chair has been an MP from the majority as has always been the case in France.

Table 1. Personal and political backgrounds of MPs when they become chair of the ESC or of the two EU Delegations within the French Parliament

| | Chairs | Period of chair | Age | Number of elections | MPs for | Minister before | Minister after |
|----|--------------|-----------------|----------|---------------------|-------------|-----------------|----------------|
| C. | J. Davies | 1974-1976 | 58 years | 2 | 4 years | Y | N |
| | J. Eden | 1976-1979 | 51 | 8 | 22 | Y | N |
| | J. Silverman | 1979-1983 | 74 | 9 | 34 | N | N |
| | N. Spearing | 1983-1992 | 53 | 5 | 13 | N | N |
| | J. Hood | 1992-2006 | 44 | 2 | 5 | N | N |
| | M. Connarty | since 2006 | 59 | 4 | 14 | N (PPS) | - |
| NA | M. Cointat | 79-80/86-88 | 58 | 4 | 12 | Y | Y |
| | M. Lauriol | 1980-1981 | 64 | 3 | 11 | N | N |
| | C. Josselin | 81-85/88-92 | 43 | 2 | 5 | N | Y |
| | G. Gouzes | 1985-1986 | 42 | 1 | 4 | N | N |
| | M. Pezet | 1992-1993 | 50 | 2 | 6 | N | N |
| | R. Pandraud | 1993-1997 | 65 | 3 | 5 | Y | N |
| | H. Nallet | 1997-1999 | 58 | 3 | 2 | Y | N |
| | A. Barrau | 1999-2002 | 50 | 3 | 9 | N | N |
| | P. Lequiller | since 2002 | 53 | 4 | 14 | N | - |
| S. | J. Genton | 1979-1998 | 61 | 1 S. | 4 AN, 8 S. | N | N |
| | M. Barnier | 1998-1999 | 47 | 5 AN, 1 S. | 15 AN, 1 S. | Y | Y |
| | H. Haenel | since 1999 | 57 | 2 S. | 13 S. | N | - |

Note: NA = National Assembly, S. = Senate, C. = House of Commons. At the Commons, the committee taken into account is the *Select Committee on European Community Secondary Legislation* up to 1998 and the *European Scrutiny Committee* then.

Sources: Hochedez, Patriarche, 1998: 222; Saulnier, 2002: 346.

All Delegation and ESC chairs since Maastricht have been interviewed which represents four deputies at the National Assembly (Robert Pandraud and Pierre Lequiller from the right and the socialist Henri Nallet and Alain Barrau) and two Labour MPs at the Commons, Jimmy Hood and Michael Connarty⁴. Asked about their motivations for chairing

⁴ Alain Barrau, interview n° 1 realised on the 30th of June 2003 in Paris; Pierre Lequiller, interview n° 2 realised on the 13th of March 2003 in Paris, interview n° 3 realised by Dana Manescu on the 23rd of November 2006 in Paris; Henri Nallet, interview n° 4 realised on the 21st of October 2002 in Neuilly; Robert Pandraud, interview n° 5 realised in the 11th of January 2002 in Paris, interview n° 6 realised on le 20th of November 2006 in Paris;

their committee, those MPs emphasised their intellectual interests (Connarty), their passion (Lequiller) and their enthusiasm (Hood) as regards European issues.

Hood: *“I’m very much an enthusiastic European. Principally because I’ve been involved in European politics for the last fourteen years, since I’ve been a member. I’ve always been on the European legislation committee previously; I now chair the European scrutiny committee. [...] If you ask me what I think of Europe... I’m very pro-European. I’m enthusiastic, and I’m always more than willing to defend the cause of the European Union”*⁵.

Connarty: *“And intellectually of course, I find it very stimulating to see the forces at work within the Commission and within the Commission working groups and both intellectually and politically. The interactions between the various delegations at COSAC⁶ where the committees meet. All of the Future of Europe conferences, or the tripartite meetings with the members of the European Parliament, I find that very stimulating”* (n° 8).

Why did you choose to be a member of the Delegation.. ?

Lequiller: *“Well, I have always been pro-European, I have always been passionate about European issues. And what’s more, I think that for a young person this is the only interesting thing because it is the big stake for tomorrow. And well, added to that, from a family point of view, my mother is British, I spent my childhood aboard and so I have the international and European virus”* (n° 2).

As indicated by Lequiller’s allusion to his family background, building a role as European specialist requires reference to past experiences presented as a proof of fidelity (Barrau) or of competence (Nallet).

Nallet : *“I became a chair for simple reasons, which is that I have always been interested in European issues. I started to work in that area a long time ago but above all in 81 when I was an advisor to the President of the Republic on agriculture and community issues. It was part of my responsibilities. I have been closely associated with all community bargaining: 82-83, the first CAP reform, the British cheque, the European Council of Fontainebleau in 84. [...] Then I was appointed Minister for Agriculture and I did copious amounts of work on community issues. I did a lot.. I was really interested. And I think I did a good job. I knew my stuff”*.

Why did you choose to be a member of the Delegation in ‘97?

Barrau: *“Because I was interested in it. It has always interested me. When I was at university, I did a master’s thesis on Aristide Briand and the European project from*

Michael Connarty, interview n° 7 realised on the 18th of July 2001 in London, interview n° 8 realised on the 13th of December 2007 by phone; Jimmy Hood, interview n° 9 realised on the 11th of July 2001 in London. All interviews are face-to-face interviews, except for n° 8. The MPs have been interviewed when chairing (interviews n° 2, 3, 8, 9) or after (interviews n° 1, 4, 5, 6), Connarty’s first interview was realised five years before his chairmanship. Some other interviews done with clerks of the committees are also used.

⁵ Each quotation in italic comes from an interview realised for this study. A number is indicated when a chair gave two interviews. The interviews in French have been translated with Chantal Barry whom I thank. I would also like to thank the Chairs for giving the interviews and also for not asking for anonymity.

⁶ The COSAC (Conference of the specialised committees for community affairs) is a half-yearly meeting of MPs from very national legislatures within the country that holds the Presidency of the Council. EU committees chairs usually participate to it.

1926 to '31. I taught courses on European institutions at University and on professional training courses in NGOs”.

The malleability and the polysemy of the reference to Europe enable each chair to europeanise his biography, be it European police cooperation for Pandraud who was formerly a high civil servant of the Home Affairs administration, Nallet's spin to President Mitterrand, Barrau's membership of the European Parliament (as a MEP and then as a clerk) or Lequiller's early connections in Eastern Europe⁷.

The European specialist is thus an MP who claims to be long familiar with European issues and passionate about them. His/her passion for Europe expresses both pro-European feelings and a taste for intellectual curiosity. Some members of the EU committees and specially the chairs thus tend to present themselves as *The European Specialist* or as *Dr Europe* – the French's best appellation being “*Monsieur Europe*”. Most of the chairs tend to present themselves in such a way, at least from time to time, with the feeling or the hope that they will be identified as such by their colleagues. A. Barrau explains for instance: “*The funny – but limited - side to the question is that it [being a chair] exists for colleagues, one becomes the Assembly's “Monsieur Europe”.* In some cases, the building of such a role results from an active strategy as illustrated by this interview of someone close to Lequiller: “*What he wants is to appear as the “Monsieur Europe” of the right [...] We see a lot of journalists. We have very good connections with them, the feeling is good but there are too few results in the media. Lequiller tries to appear as “Monsieur Europe” to the press*”⁸.

At the House of Commons, the European specialist is characterised by a specific Scottish dimension given the origins of the last two chairs and of some other members of the ESC. Speaking with a Scottish accent and referring frequently to Scotland – Connarty used the word “Scot” seventeen times during a one-hour interview – enables them to demonstrate a special relation with the European process by opposition to a purposely “insular” England.

How do you see your role as a member of a national parliament in the European Union?

Connarty: “*Well for me, because I am very pro-European, it is to argue within my Parliament for a more open and creative response to the common agenda in terms that come from other European countries. I think we are a very insular nation and as a Scot I see the dominant nation, the English nation, as being particularly insular*” (n°7).

Despite this regional identification, chairs do not behave like *Constituent Members*. The scrutiny activities of the ESC and of the Delegation are too remote from the constituency to

⁷ He published a book about the enlargement in 1994 (Lequiller, 1994).

⁸ Interview in Paris on the 16th of September 2003.

hope that they may help to attain re-election. All the chairs considered were actually elected from safe a constituency⁹. Among Constituency MPs, some *Local Promoters* have become experts in EU fund-raising. However, it does not seem to be necessary for that purpose to be an active member of the ESC. Connarty thus indicates that even if he first came to the select committee with his constituency in mind, little by little he became interested in more general issues.

Why are you a member of the European Scrutiny Committee?

Connarty: *“Well the reason for me, it was that I had a point of view about what these directives could offer to my local constituency in the first place, that’s my first interest in the committee, to see how these things apply locally. And I went on, probably with the same motivation [...] but since, I’ve realized a lot of things that could impact the structures of our governments and the way our government performs on the European dimension is not ever going to be in the longer time to bring benefits to my constituents and to Scotland”* (n°7).

3. The impossible institutionalisation of Dr Europe as a parliamentary role

Despite the institutional changes provoked by the creation of EU committees and despite the strategies followed by most of their chairs, a parliamentary role or sub-role as European specialist has not emerged either at the Commons or at the National Assembly. The prescriptions associated with such a role in terms of behaviour or of opinion are difficult to identify clearly. The capacity of an MP to be situated and identified within a legislature through European expertise is uncertain. Role distance and even the refusal of some European committees members to behave like specialists are frequent. This resistance by the previous repertoire of roles within the two Assemblies to the emergence of a new role thus illustrates the contribution of the roles played to the stability of a legislature. Institutions do resist change through the roles played within them.

The elements that lead to the assertion that Dr Europe does not exist as a cohesive and coherent parliamentary role are numerous but scattered. Pandraud did not really try to appear as such. Hood’s attendance was irregular (Waller, Criddle, 2007). During autumn 2008, Connarty was described on several occasions by the British media as a “Eurosceptic chair”. During their interviews, Barrau took some distance with his reputation as European expert and Nallet explained that the Delegation did not have any concrete influence on French European policy. The political capital associated with being chair is also reduced. In January 2001, the French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin selected one of his communist ministers for

⁹ With the exception of Barrau that was elected in 1997 with three candidates in the second round. He was among the most active MP from 1997 to 2002, and eventually lost his seat in 2002.

the local elections at Béziers whereas Barrau, a former mayor of this city, was interested in being nominated. Similarly, in March 2006, N. Sarkozy evicted Lequiller from his position as vice-chair of the European People's Party¹⁰.

All these elements converge to indicate that even if chairing the European committee is an identified position within each parliament, this position has not been institutionalised to the extent of appearing as a parliamentary role. Claiming to be an EU expert within the two houses is not associated with a cohesive and comprehensive pattern of behaviour and attitudes. Here the motivational approach to roles is helpful to understand why the attempt to create the role of Dr Europe has been both limited and unsuccessful. In short, there has been little motivation for the role. Those chairs who have sought to create it and to play the role have not been convinced and have not convinced their colleagues because appearing as such did not entail sufficient gratification for them. Three different goals might be expected from playing such a role: progress in the political career, defence of a vision of Europe or influence over the national European position. Explaining why, for the last fifteen years, MPs specialised in European matters within the National Assembly or the Commons have reached none of those three goals, would take a large number of pages. The demonstration will therefore be reduced to the main elements.

1- Firstly, chairing the European committee does not help the chair to become a minister mainly because the chairs are selected according to the seniority rule. Table 1 indicates that, on average, MPs have become chair during their third mandate since 1992 - after seven years at the National Assembly and nine at the Commons. The seniority rule means that ambitious backbenchers cannot expect to use the chair as a means to accede to the cabinet. Neither can they expect to meet high flying politicians since the latter do not belong to the committee and may become a member only at the end of their career. In some cases indeed, the chair is used in order to “thank” previous ministers, which means giving a symbolic position to politicians who have previously occupied a more significant position. Pandraud and Nallet were well-known ministers during the ‘80s and the ‘90s. Connarty was a Parliamentary Private Secretary from 1997 to 1998. He acceded to the chair in 2006 at a time when his chances of entering the Cabinet were considerably reduced. Beyond the seniority rule, the reduced potential of specialising in EU affairs also derives from the subjective value and the selection process regarding political jobs that can be qualified as “European”. The

¹⁰ Sarkozy was at that time President of the UMP, the main right wing party. Lequiller seemingly paid on that occasion his support for President Chirac Cf. “Barnier et Lequiller dans le même fauteuil”, *Le Figaro*, the 30th of March 2006.

positions of MEP, Commissioner and even Minister for European Affairs are not among the most prized for British and French politicians. Above all, the party gate-keepers do not usually select specialists of European affairs for those positions¹¹. Interviewed one year before the European elections of 2004, Barrau was confident about his chances of being selected on one of the lists of the French socialist party. In the end, this was not the case. Lastly, the level of Euro-scepticism in British public opinion as well as the reduced interest of the French and British mass media for European issues does not contribute to lending more political weight to the European issues expert. The interviews given by the chairs actually indicate that they are aware of that.

Hood: *“It wasn’t what we call a sexy committee, you know... politically sexy”*.

Connarty: *“When I asked to be on the committee after 1998 when I was a Parliamentary secretary, the Chief whip said to me, ‘it doesn’t go very far, it doesn’t travel very far’. So I actually went to the committee so it could travel. I wanted to go the committee because I thought, ‘this is the committee where a lot of the business of this House will be focused in the future’”* (n°7).

2- Secondly, as paradoxical as it may seem, parliamentary experts on European issues are not in a position where they can ardently promote specific European ideologies, be they Federalist or Eurosceptic. With the exception of Pandraud, the chairs are more pro-European than the median backbencher. However, none of them can be regarded as an *Ideologue*. Regarding the ESC, the two last chairs have not always presented themselves as “pro-European”. Hood explains: *“In the olden days... I was... and I mean olden days, I mean the ‘70s you know... I was anti-Europe. I was anti-common market”*. Connarty opposed the third reading of the Maastricht bill in 1993. Both of them recognize that they did not come initially to the ESC in order to promote a specific vision for Europe. Connarty wanted to help his region and Hood confusedly explains that he went *“with the flow”*.

And why did you choose to be a member of that committee?

Hood: *“Likely it was a sort of... from my point of view... because... it was... when you come in here as a new member of parliament you do not know how the place works. You’re very green. It’s like starting a new job. You just go with the flow”*.

In France, Nallet, Barrau and Lequiller have a more coherent background but the interviews indicate that they refuse to present themselves as ideologues. Barrau describes himself as a *“moderate Federalist”* who is *“not Europeist but European”*. Lequiller uses the register of feelings rather than reason.

¹¹ The counter-example is the former chair of the Delegation of the Senate, Michel Barnier, who became after a member of the European Commission and a significant minister of several cabinets. However, it should be noted that Barnier had already been Minister for Europe before chairing the Delegation in 1998.

What makes you tick?

Lequiller: *“Well, it’s a passion! It’s because I am passionate about it. Honestly, I am not telling you any secret but it is the first time in my life that I feel completely comfortable, professionally”* (n° 2).

Pandraud’s European position is more complex since he admits to have been Eurosceptic before and was often regarded as such. However, he indicates during both interviews that he *“[doesn’t] have to situate himself”* as a pro or anti European. Additionally, he supported most of the European treaties at the Assembly.

Pandraud’s moderate opposition to the EU as well as the other chairs’ moderate support indicate that they do not seek in priority to promote a specific vision for Europe. Several institutional logics thus tend to exclude ideologues MPs from chairmanship. Supporting a particular vision of Europe would first undermine the chair’s credibility over the members of the committee. The synthesis – or rather the equilibrium – between pro and anti EU has also constituted a distinctive feature of each committee since the beginning. The Select committee of the Commons was created with the fear of a loss of parliamentary sovereignty but its first chair was pro-European¹². Likewise, the Delegation of the National Assembly was created by a coalition of nationalist Gaullists, concerned by Brussels, and of centre right pro European MPs, interested by Brussels. To finish, party gate-keepers check that those logics are followed by thrusting aside the noisier Eurosceptic MPs. Hood thus reveals that he kept chairing in 1997 even if the chair was usually given to an opposition MP since there was a risk that the Europhobe Tory Bill Cash could succeed him.

Hood: *“The notion that Bill Cash would be an objective chairman of the European select committee was not one that had support from the conservatives, nor the English or anybody else [...] We want to scrutinize to make good government, you know, not to be destructive and anti”*.

3- Thirdly, the role of specialist of Europe is neither attractive nor convincing since it does not give access to influence over policy-making. Proofs of that very limited influence are numerous. The MPs, the clerks and the ministers for Europe cannot give any example of influence apart from a dramatically limited number of anecdotes. Studies of the French and British policy-making regarding the EU confirm the monopoly of the cabinet and the bureaucracy (Forster, Blair, 2002; Allen, 2005; Rozenberg, 2006). The limited impact of parliamentary European activities first derives from the generally limited impact of national legislatures in Europe regarding any topic, especially in majoritarian democracies such as the

¹² John Davies, chair from 1974 to 1976, was a pro European Tory and was then appointed to the European Commission.

UK and France in which the number of veto-players is reduced (Tsebelis, 2002). If, as stressed by Tapio Raunio (2005: 336), “the power of parliament independent of [European] integration emerged as the only necessary cause” for explaining the degree of control of the government in EU matters, then the chairs of the ESC and the Delegation cannot expect changing dramatically the cabinet position. The impact of the European information collected is all the more limited that the two selected houses are generally regarded as “talking” rather “working” parliaments, oriented towards representation functions rather than governance (Wessels, 2005). In addition, as pointed to by Katrin Auel and Arthur Benz (2005), parliamentary influence regarding European affairs implicitly supposes cooperation behind close doors since a public and open scrutiny could tie the ends of the minister in the Council. Such cooperation behind close doors is not frequent within both houses. Last, the European policy of each Member State is the produce of an internal compromise. The centralised type of coordination used by the British and French administration (Kassim, 2005) means that national MPs should influence a network of governmental departments rather than a single actor. And this is all the more difficult that these networks have developed their own legitimate way of talking about Europe (Eymeri, 2002).

Beyond the specificity of France and the UK, the limited impact of European activities of national legislatures over the policy-making also points to the difficult importation of Keith Krehbiel’s information theory (1991) within the twofold context of European majoritarian democracies and of the scrutiny of EU affairs. As far as EU business is concerned, national MPs undoubtedly suffer from a deficit of information to the profit of national administrations and governments (Maurer, Mittag, Wessels, 2003). However, contrary to Tapio Raunio and Simon Hix’s expectations (2000), reducing this information gap is not a safe way of securing influence since the parliamentary influence in the Westminster model largely depends on the *number* of majority MPs willing to rebel against the cabinet. The parliamentary logic of influence is still quantitative before being informative. For instance, Westminster’s opposition to the Euro and French MPs’ reluctance to the enlargement to Turkey are far more influential than any accurate informed report on those topics. The level of expertise within a specific field may nevertheless give some influence to an MP. However, what is true for energy, environment and health is not true for Europe as a whole. European affairs are so large, so various, and even so overloaded, than it is almost impossible to pretend to be an expert – or more exactly to pretend to gain influence from expertise. Experts may be influential within particular European sub-fields – as illustrated by the seven sub-committees of the EU committee of the House of Lords (Cygan, 1998) – but chairs cannot actually claim to be

specialist of each European project. In the end, the interviewed chairs do not seem to expect to change the details of their government European policy. Some of them, like Connarty, refuse to specialize: “*I just don’t think you just have to choose what you specialize in*” (n°7). He even explains why he joined the ESC from a generalist standpoint: “*I could as a [former] PPS, ask to join a departmental committee, but there aren’t any departmental committees that cover all the areas that I had interest in*” (n°7).

In the end, it appears that, for various reasons linked both to EU affairs and to national political systems, specialising in European affairs at the House of Commons and at the National Assembly is not an efficient strategy for entering the cabinet, defending a cleaved vision of Europe or influencing the national position on European projects. Some chairs have tried to play a new role of expert of Europe but this role eventually failed due to an insufficient motivation. The fact that specialised tasks and procedures linked to EU activities failed to be transformed into a dedicated parliamentary role thus indicates how crucial roles contribution is for explaining the inertia of institutions. Up to that point however, role and rational choice’s theory lead to the same conclusion. Variations between the two approaches seem to be only a question of words – roles vs. strategies, motivations vs. interest – which would justify fusing them (Strøm, 1997). However, the concept of role is more useful in order to explain the actual behaviour and attitudes of the chairs knowing that their interest and motivation to scrutinize EU affairs are limited. Why do some MPs spend several hours or days a week reading projects of resolutions, drafting reports and hearing cabinet members if their interests for doing so are limited? Our answer is that their favourite parliamentary role adapts itself to this new position because emotional gratifications proper to this role can be developed through the involvement in EU affairs. In the following sections of the paper, four ways of chairing the EU committees will thus be considered. Each of them is linked to a previously existing parliamentary role and driven by emotional expectations. By offering to different patterns of role the opportunity to be played, EU committees and their chairmanship eventually contribute to an incremental change of the repertoire of roles of each house and, in the end, to Europeanise both chambers¹³.

¹³ Nallet was the closest to the role of Dr Europe. In the interview he gave, it seems that he was fully satisfied with the only intellectual part of the chair. He said: “*It interested me a lot because I like the community machinery, because those topics interest me and also because I think I had a certain competence for them [...]. The Delegation did not present a single report that I had not read before, that I had not annotated, for which I did not give my opinion. I worked a lot. I don’t regret it. I learnt a lot of stuffs*”. From this extract, the intellectual curiosity and the feeling of being competent constituted two motivations for chairing the Delegation. Nallet is

4. The *Chair of a Select Committee*: a taste for game playing

Searing distinguishes preference roles, defined as informal roles played by backbencher MPs, from position roles, which are leadership positions as parliamentary private secretaries, whips or ministers. To a large extent, being chair of any parliamentary select committee is closer to the second category. It is actually a leadership position, used in order to identify the MP that exercises it, and to which a coherent pattern of behaviours, attitudes and motivations can be associated. Among the prescriptions proper to such a role in the UK as well as in France, the management of a team of clerks, the driving of the work of the committee in a fair and consensual way, and the development of a good working atmosphere should be mentioned. The chairpersons of the ESC and of the Delegation are institutionally led to behave in such a way, but it appears that Pandraud and Hood have specially chosen to adopt this role. The choice to behave as a *Chairperson of a select committee* and not only as an expert on European issues stems from the failure of the role of *Dr Europe* to emerge but also from the adequacy between the role of chairperson and the psychological incentives of these two MPs. Hood and Pandraud stressed the pleasure they got from being the chairpersons of their respective committees. When Hood explains why he remained a chairman after the alternation of 1997, he concludes by: “*and last thing, I’ve enjoyed it*”. The way in which he appropriates not only the work of the ESC but the committee itself indicates how proud he is to occupy this position. He speaks of “*one of my special advisors*” or of “*the people I have on my committee*”. Interviewed five years after his chairmanship, Pandraud does not hide the nostalgia he feels for his committee:

What did you enjoy the most when you were chairman of the Delegation?

Pandraud : “*Chairing the committee* [présider]

Sorry?

Chairing the meetings and having the authority of a chairperson in relations with governmental bodies” (n° 5).

“*I tried to be as good a chair as possible. But I missed it. I missed it.*

You missed being there?

I missed not being Chairman any more” (n° 5).

Hood and Pandraud explain that they enjoyed all the activities involved in being chair: the management of civil servants, relations with the other MPs in the committee, the trips, etc... From this point of view, chairing the Delegation or the ESC seems particularly

not analysed in the next sections since he seemed rather satisfied with “*l’art pour l’art*”. However, it should be noted that he chaired the Delegation for only two years and that he left political activities then.

attractive: the chair is largely autonomous in the management of the committee, there are many civil servants – Hood stresses that he has “*the largest staff of any select committee in here*” – and the trips are frequent. Pandraud insists on the quality of the relations within the committee and Hood on the inter-parliamentary meetings.

Pandraud: “*First, I believe that we have done our best to defend the interests of France and the French. On a more basic level just after that, I shall say that, for me, it was especially exciting. A unique experience in an administrative and political career, helped by assistants and civil servants who were particularly open and competent and by very unique fellow MPs*” (n° 5).

Hood: “*It gave me the wonderful opportunity to... to go and meet fellow politicians doing the same as I’m doing in their own country. That’s when I meet Alain Barrau every six months. And I meet with the Germans and Finns and the Swedes every six months. And we are... well its not friends... but we are friends and colleagues you know... and we got on well together*”.

Beyond those numerous gratifications, being chair satisfies the emotional incentive of playing the game, that is “the need to compete with others in structured, intellectually challenging interactions” (Payne, 1986: 10). The chairpersons of the Delegation or the ESC have to face two types of challenge related first to cohesion of the committee and second to the government scrutiny. Internally, a priority for the chairman is to limit the cleavages among the members of the committee. This issue is all the more significant for the Delegation and the ESC as their work does not easily lend itself to the majority/opposition cleavage. Indeed, the majoritarian logic does not fit well with the fact that it is European legislative projects – rather than governmental bills – which are under scrutiny. Not only does this lead chairs not to present themselves as *Ideologue* as has already been said but it also leads them to try to seek a minimal synthesis between Eurosceptics and Europhiles. The chairmanship of Pandraud, which occurred when the Delegation had just been given new prerogatives, was especially characterised by the gap between MPs in favour or against the Maastricht treaty. In 1992 indeed, the referendum on the treaty had deeply divided the French right.

Pandraud: “*Most of the decisions that we did took were almost always taken unanimously. Which was not easy. I do not mean unanimity among the leaders of the party groups – which itself is difficult to obtain – but of the unanimity of all the MPs. The most difficult task I had was to lead the RPR¹⁴ to adopt common positions. There were two particularly divided trends here. And I did it. I did it. Not always easy*” (n°5).

The prolixity of Pandraud on that topic and the explanations of his strategies not only indicate how significant this issue was for him but also that solving it gave him great pleasure.

¹⁴ Rally for the Republic [Rassemblement pour la République], a neo-Gaullist party of the French right.

Pandraud: *“I tired to find a balance between both tendencies. And it is true that unanimity is not always easy to obtain. There were irreducible opponents to our positions. So I arranged for the pleasure to last until one of them had to go to the toilet and as soon as he did I took a vote. But however you look at it, we had a unanimous position, it is the role of the chairperson to achieve this”* (n° 5).

On some occasions, the price for reaching unanimity was the adoption of parliamentary resolutions characterised by a high level of generality. Such lack of precision made the resolutions less useful for helping or influencing the cabinet and the administration.

Secondly, scrutiny of the government's European policy tends to be seen by those chairs as equivalent to playing a game with the cabinet. The purpose of this game is to obtain strategic information from the government by playing by several rules such as formal procedures, parliamentary decorum and majority cohesion. The public – or semi-public – parliamentary hearings are particularly enjoyed by the chairpersons as they offer a direct and theatrical confrontation.

Hood: *“It can be very challenging and interesting. Dare I say it? It can be good fun. But good fun... I keep saying... good fun with a purpose. And the purpose is, is to help the government through good scrutiny, so you can have fun doing your scrutiny, as long as the purpose of that fun is to get better service delivered to the government”*.

Pandraud: *“It has to be said that the ministers were taken to the cleaners. And above all, I think it was quite novel: the minister for European affairs told us what the prey was... or at least the hare, and the horde of technical ministers were behind it. And we got as far as the technical ministers and some of them really got taken to the cleaners. The minister for Industry, for Labour... when they were heard by our committee... [...] De Silguy was slaughtered. He thought we were a horde of savages »* (n° 5)¹⁵.

The metaphor with hunting activities is similarly used, quiet greedily, by Hood in order to justify the appointment of some former ministerial civil servants:

Hood : *“Now, we have a saying in the UK: ‘poacher turned gamekeeper’, do you know what that means? If you have a poacher whose out... you know... who poaches animals and he stops doing that and he’s given the gamekeeper’s job and the gamekeeper’s job is to catch the poacher you see. Well the poacher turned gamekeeper knows how the poacher operates. And that’s why our staff is former staffs of the departments”*.

The scrutiny of European affairs thus offers emotional incentives to MPs attracted by challenges. However, the game opposing the cabinet and the parliament can be played on other grounds. For instance, Pandraud, disillusioned at the end of his career on most aspects of the parliamentary job, was nonetheless still interested in the inquiries committee: *“It's nonetheless one of the only things where, to put it simply, I was getting a kick out of sitting in*

¹⁵ The French Yves-Thibault de Silguy was member of the European Commission.

the inquiry committee; apart from that...” (n°6). The wish to play the role of *Chairperson of a select committee* and the enjoyment in doing so thus derives largely from the opportunities associated with this position, notably when scrutinizing the government, rather than from an intrinsic interest for European business.

The main consequence in choosing such a role over the activities of the ESC and the Delegation lies in the energy used by those two chairpersons to defend the committee and to develop its legal prerogatives and its human resources. Thus, the chairmanship of Hood and Pandraud took place during a period when the number of civil servants was increased. The development of a parliamentary bureaucracy was used in order to realise a detailed and comprehensive scrutiny of each European project – the Commons and the French National Assembly being in the forefront in Europe in that area at the end of the ‘90s. Both presidents also obtained the right to scrutinize new categories of EU legislation projects. In France, the Prime Minister Edouard Balladur committed his government to respecting a parliamentary reserve in June 1994. In October of the same year, Pandraud forced the cabinet to use the reserve. He was helped in this by the President of the Assembly, Philippe Séguin (Séguin, 2003: 417-18; Nuttens, 2001: 142-44). Both of them were protesting against the late submission of a text. The Delegation lodged a proposal of parliamentary resolution, called the minister straight away and waited for him for three hours. Eventually, the adoption of the text in question by the Council was deferred. By contrast, the successors of Pandraud and Hood have shown less interest for the thankless scrutiny of EU projects – even if they have not given it up.

Although both Hood and Pandraud played a similar role as *Chairperson of a select committee*, some variations, linked to their own psychological aspirations, can be noted. Hood became more and more consensual and attracted by parliamentary conviviality. Whereas he was a member of the extreme left group “Campagin” after his first election in 1987 and whereas he voted against the first Gulf War in 1990, an almanac published in 2002 presented him as “latterly mellowed as a pro-European Commons chairman” and treading “the path of respectable obscurity as chairman of the Select committee on European Scrutiny” (Waller, Criddle, 2002: 253). He was even suspected in 1998 of having helped the Health minister not to be heard on a delicate affair (Waller, Criddle, 1999: 207). During the interview, he explains that he devotes two days a week to the committee as against five for Pandraud. The chairman of the Delegation showed more aggressiveness against the government as illustrated by the tone of the following extract from one of his reports: “Your *rapporteur* is of the opinion that there is some wavering in the management of this file by the French administration, two

departments being in charge of it [...]. Due to this concurrence, it would appear that the file is not being followed-up effectively”¹⁶. The specificities observed in the way Pandraud and Hood interpreted the role of chairperson are connected with the choices made by their successors. By emphasizing the conviviality of the chairmanship, Barrau turned the European specialist into a *Member of a club*. By fostering control over the cabinet and the quest for the Truth, Connarty has been perceived as an *Inquisitor*.

5. The *Club Member* and the conviviality incentive

Club Members play a well identified role within many parliaments. They are known as “a pillar of the Assembly” in France or a “parliament person” at Westminster. This kind of MP frequently attends committee meetings and appears weekly on the backbench of the assembly during plenary sessions. Club members are not especially motivated by protection of their constituents, the promotion of their career or the advocacy of certain principles but first and foremost by the “the need to please [their colleagues] and gain their approval” (Payne, 1986: 10). The conviviality incentive is central to their psychological profile and finds satisfaction within the parliament which they see as operating like a club. Indeed, the anthropologist Marc Abélès (2001) highlights how numerous the similarities between a club and parliament are: an entrance fee has to be paid, the topography itself shows how exclusive membership is, members are formally equal and share certain little day-to-day privileges. In his study of the National Assembly, he interprets the use of the familiar “*tu*” instead of the more formal “*vous*” as a “convention aimed at indicating a community of status” (Abélès, 2001: 107) and notes that the Delegation for EU is characterized by its similarity to a “club” (158).

Some European specialists, like Barrau, behave like club members. This former MP hardly ever talks about someone without mentioning that she/he is friend of great value. In his vocabulary, his colleagues are tuned into mates and the high flyers of French political life are always mentioned by their first names. “*Martine*” and “*Elisabeth*” thus refer to the former well-known ministers of the Jospin cabinet, Martine Aubry and Elisabeth Guigou. Barrau talks about an MP as “*one of my good mattes*” and explains that the clerk of a given committee was a “*very talented lawyer*”. When speaking about the assignment to standing committees of the proposals for resolutions – which reduces the power of the Delegation – he

¹⁶ Report n°2459 of the Delegation of the National Assembly for the EU, *L'Assemblée nationale et l'Europe. Quelle influence sur la législation communautaire ?*, 20th of December 1995.

explains: “*We have to fight, we have to explain to our mates, to the guys on the committee that it's important. We had a lot of connections, we had connections with everybody*”. Searing explains that club members are particularly willing to highlight their trans-party connections¹⁷. One year after his electoral defeat in 2002, Barrau describes his successful right-wing opponent as a “*nice guy*”. He explains that he systematically invited Eurosceptical politicians to Delegation conferences and adds about one of them: “*What's more, I like Berthu, and I think he's good on legal questions*”. Finally, when Barrau was asked to evaluate the three years of his chairmanship, sociability and even friendship came first.

Barrau: “*I deliberately developed a workload which was both intense and somewhat convivial. For instance, I think it was one of the few places within the Assembly – I didn't do this on purpose, it just happened – where during meetings, the MPs used the “tu” pronoun.*

Whatever their...

Whatever side they were on. Whereas most of the time, we use the informal “tu” pronoun at the Assembly bar or in the lobby but not within committees. But on my committee, we used first names, we used the “tu” pronoun. There was really a feeling that we were doing something together - I would say from different standpoints – for Europe, for France within Europe”.

The autonomy of Delegation management and the relative marginality of this structure explains why a club member would feel comfortable within it. In return, the choice of such a role by the chair had several consequences for Delegation activities as a whole. For three years, Barrau developed all kinds of meetings: a succession of eleven hearings of well-known politicians in 2001, half-a-dozen public symposia, a variety of ad hoc events, the receiving of parliamentary delegations from Eastern Europe, trips aboard, joint meetings with certain standing committees within the Assembly, monthly lunches with EU ambassadors, etc. Participation at these various events was by invitation from the chair and, regarding politicians, came from across the political spectrum. The desire to establish connections, to meet people and to introduce people to each other was not limited to the parliamentary field. The workshops regularly received trade unions and representatives from professional organisations and NGOs.

The conviviality incentive led Barrau to angle the Delegation toward specific activities and to theorise in some way the new role for parliaments within the twofold context of the EU and of the growth of non-party actors. According to his views, parliament should be “*a place for meetings about the big issues at stake*”. The legitimacy of the assembly depends therefore

¹⁷ Within the role of *Parliament men*, Searing identifies three sub-roles : the *Club men*, the *Spectators* and the *Status seekers* (1994: 131-95, here p. 177).

on its capacity to voice public debate – including on European issues – by organising a dialogue between contradictory stakeholders.

Barrau: “*This is one of my theses: the Assembly is a locus of representative democracy but if we don’t want participatory democracy to remain just a slogan, then the Assembly must contribute to this trend. The Assembly should be a place where participatory democracy is invited in, a place for the starting of...*”.

The Delegation of the National Assembly for the EU actually opened itself up to NGOs and various societal interests during the chairmanship of Barrau. However, the emphasis placed on meetings had unexpected consequences such as a lower priority for standard scrutiny of EU documents, difficulties in involving MPs in all those meetings, and to some extent a dissipation of efforts. Lastly, the aversion of club members to conflict can limit accuracy when scrutiny of the cabinet's European policy is being carried out. A parliamentary report produced by the Delegation praising the controversial Treaty of Nice and also the much criticized strategy of the French government during the Council of Nice illustrates this point clearly¹⁸. From that point of view, the *Club Member* and the *Inquisitor* constitute two opposite roles available to the chairpersons of the European committees, at least at the Commons and at the National Assembly.

6. The Moral Imperative Incentive of the *Inquisitor*

Whereas *Club members* develop social activities when chairing the ESC or the Delegation, some chairs prefer to emphasise government scrutiny. Government scrutiny has taken root at Westminster to such an extent that this parliamentary practice has slowly evolved into an identified role or sub-role: the *Inquisitor*. The characteristic behaviour of such a role is to undertake inquiries with obstinacy, indiscretion and sometimes authoritarianism. The *Inquisitor* is of the opinion that governments tend to hide information and that MPs have a duty to restore the Truth. The obligation incentive, this “need to follow one’s conscience, to engage in morally correct behaviour” (Payne 1984: 10), constitutes the primary motivation of *Inquisitors* and may lead them to rebel against their party. Connarty has been a member of the ESC since 1998 and succeeded Hood as chair in October 2006. Within a few months, he had adopted the prescriptions of the role of *Inquisitor* to the point that one year later he was awarded the prize of « Inquisitor of the year »¹⁹.

¹⁸ Report n°2905 of the Delegation of the National Assembly for the EU presented by Barrau, about the French presidency, 31st January 2001.

¹⁹ Among others prizes, the price is given each year by *Spectator* magazine and a firm called Threadneedle.

Indeed, during autumn 2007, Connarty opposed himself vehemently to the British government's official position regarding negotiations on a new European treaty following the failure of the draft constitutional treaty. On the 9th of October 2007, the ESC published a report about the on-going intergovernmental conference that criticized the "marginalisation" of national parliaments during the bargaining and stated that the new treaty would produce "substantially equivalent effects" to the constitutional treaty "for those countries which have not requested derogations or opt outs"²⁰. On the same day, Connarty declared on BBC radio: "We think that the red lines are not viable". The concept of red lines was supported by the Brown cabinet with a view to indicating how successful the defence of national interests was and to promoting parliamentary ratification rather than a referendum. The chair of the ESC was well aware that his attacks were all the more harmful for Brown's cabinet as, in October 2007, the majority had been experiencing multiple unexpected difficulties for several weeks and that the Prime Minister's popularity was starting to decline in the polls.

On the 16th of October 2007, two days before the opening of the Council of Lisbon, the Foreign Office Minister was heard by the ESC. The hearing of David Miliband, a young minister chosen in June 2007, lasted more than two hours and was extensively covered in the British media²¹. This particular moment helps to capture how radicalised Connarty has become in acting as chair. He opened the hearing by expressing his regret that he had received an important letter from the minister only one hour earlier and estimated that this was "not a good sign". As the minister started to apologise, he interrupted him: "You can answer when I finish". Later, he estimated that Miliband's reply was not developed enough: "You haven't quite answered the question". Above all, Connarty commented on the speech of the minister by saying: "I have visions of 'peace in our time' when you speak, Secretary of State". The MPs and the journalists in the room knew that the expression had been used by Neville Chamberlain on the 30th of September 1938 in order to justify the Munich agreement. A little while later, Connarty grudgingly agreed to apologize for this highly controversial reference. Lastly, he declared on the floor of the House on the 11th of December 2007:

"I am disappointed that we are having another general debate on European affairs and not being given a full debate on the Reform Treaty. I believe there is a technical term - not one I knew before I came into Parliament - that the Government is *frit* to have a debate on the issue that really is at the heart of Europe. We have a term for it in Scotland: Feart"²².

²⁰ *ESC Thirty-fifth Report of Session 2006/07*, "European Union Intergovernmental Conference", 9th October 2007, HC 1014, pp. 23-24.

²¹ See amongst others, the right wing tabloid, *The Daily Mail*, "Is Gordon Brown sure this man is right for the job?", 17th October 2007 and *The Times*, "Miliband angry at "peace in our time" slur", 17th October 2007.

²² "Labour MPs demand more say on EU treaty", *Press Association National Newswire*, 11th December 2007.

The chair of the ESC thus enabled Connarty to adopt a role that was consistent with his psychological expectations. In doing so, he actually renewed with the attitude he had adopted during his first mandate (1992-1997) when he opposed party lines a total of 21 times (Waller, Criddle, 1999: 331). His appointment as Private Parliamentary Secretary from 1997 to 1998 led him to calm down, a biographical review described him in 2002 as a “spiky if calmed-down” MP who “has steered clear of rebellion against the Blair government” (Waller, Criddle, 2002: 368). Connarty’s motivations revolve around notions of truth, obligation and gratitude. He estimates that in order to deserve to be an MP, he has to do his utmost to fulfil his mission: the restoring of truth. During a fifty minute interview, Connarty employed the word “truth” twelve times whereas the five other chairs interviewed never used it.

Connarty: *“We’ve been seen as being somewhat annoying because we’ve told people the truth. I used a Scottish phrase this morning when I was talking to the Prime Minister this morning in the liaison committee. We have a saying in Scottish which translates as ‘The truth is a tool that will not ring falsely’, in other words, ‘Truth is always the truth, it will never be something else’. And therefore, we are in some ways, I think, maybe it’s a bit exaggerated or arrogant to say that we try in our committee to be seeking after truth. And sometimes truth is different than our government’s perception”* (n° 8).

The quest for Truth is driven both by a vision of the democratic order and by the promotion of self-esteem. Connarty explains that he is *“sceptical of all governments”* (n° 8). Governments tend naturally to plot against the truth and the Scottish MP fears that *“that will end up maiming people’s credibility and confidence in the political process”*. He thus estimates that he acts in the interests of democracy at both national and European levels and admits that he enjoys doing so: *“The committee’s got respect doing a worthwhile job and we are seen as being the gatekeepers of Europe and that gives me such satisfaction on a day to day basis”* (n° 8). Connarty even thinks that the Prime minister - whom he has known for thirty-five years - respects and understands him despite the public attacks from the chair of the ESC. He is actually proud to have been awarded *“Inquisitor of the year”*.

Connarty: *“I find that we have gotten a very good reputation over the last year. I have no doubt about it that we have grown in stature in a way that I always had ambitions for the committee. We are seen as being the inquisitors”* (n° 8).

The remoteness of European issues and the information gap which the national parliaments suffer from, explain why an *Inquisitor* can blossom in that field. As a result, Connarty’s chairmanship since October 2006 has modified both the activities of the committee and the way they are perceived. Scrutiny procedures, particularly the hearings, are

very often used, sometimes aggressively. Such a style stands in contrast with the taste for game playing of his predecessor and with the relative docility of the club member. As indicated by the allusion to Munich, Inquisitors may “over-play” their role with the risk of giving an unintended representation of themselves and of the committee, in contradiction with the images of Dr Europe. During autumn 2007, Connarty and indeed the ESC were described as Eurosceptics and rebels in the press. When interviewed during that period, the Scottish MP denied being either of the two. He continued to portray himself as pro-European. Regarding the Lisbon treaty, he explained that he was not against it and that he was opposed to a referendum. According to him, the parliamentary control exercised by his committee was in the end favourable to Europe since it gave more democratic legitimacy to the EU. The roll call analysis of his votes in Westminster also indicates that he is actually not a “*serial rebel*”, to use his words: “*I am not a serial rebel, but I am a person of principles*” (n° 8)²³.

Yet, Connarty’s behaviour can be regarded as ambiguous regarding his feelings about Europe as well as his loyalty to the majority. When he was awarded the title of Inquisitor on the 20th March 2007, he declared during the ceremony: “I am not Eurosceptic, I am government sceptic”²⁴. The sentence indicates that he was aware of being perceived as Eurosceptic, that he wanted to change this image and that to this end he was prepared to take the risk of being seen as a rebel to his majority. By attacking Brown’s Cabinet on the red lines exactly when the opposition was developing a noisy campaign in favour of a referendum, Connarty ran the risk of being misunderstood. Regarding his pro-European sentiment, it should be noted that some of his discourses may evoke Eurosceptic rhetoric. In the UK, opponents to the EU have long used the defence of parliamentary sovereignty for argument’s sake. Similarly, the chair stressed the threat to Westminster that the new draft treaty would bring about. During a parliamentary debate on the 26th of November 2007, he issued a statement warning of “ambiguity in the draft treaty on whether a legal obligation is being imposed on parliament in respect of its proceedings”²⁵. He added that “the parliament’s right to refuse an ‘instruction’ had been a key principle in Britain’s unwritten constitution since 1688”²⁶. The claimed passion for European affairs seems finally to have been blurred by a passion for the truth of an inquisitor who has somehow been lost playing his own role.

²³ According to the Web site www.publicwhip.org.uk, in February 2008, he was the 72nd out of 356 Labour MPs ranked in descending order of rebellion with 2,1% of dissent votes since 2005.

²⁴ *The Daily Telegraph*, 16th November 2007. He used again this expression during the interview.

²⁵ Connarty is quoted, “Warning sounded over EU treaty”, *Aberdeen Press and Journal*, 27th November 2007.

²⁶ The article is quoted, *Ibid*.

7. The One who rubs shoulders with the Great and Powerful

“To be honest, what I really enjoy most is the meeting of high-level people from different countries that one would never have met before” (Searing, 1994: 165). Those words of a British MP quoted by Searing illustrate the motivations of the sub-role he called *Status seekers*. For Payne, “the need for prestige and public recognition” is one of the most frequent emotional incentives shared by politicians. The public recognition of political activities and their media coverage actually attract people with a status seeker profile. As indicated by the classification of this sub-role among the role of *Parliament men* rather than *Ministerial aspirants*, status seeking is not tantamount to ambition. An MP may try to become closer to high flying politicians without really hoping to become one of them. Status seekers may know that this ambition is beyond them. Above all, keeping the company of great men and women in itself gives this kind of MP enough satisfaction.

Occupying the chair of the Delegation and of the ESC entails meeting prestigious international leaders as the committee deals with European affairs and develops scrutiny activities rather than legislation. Interviews indicate that most of the chairs are not indifferent to public gratitude. However, interviews given by Lequiller are particularly explicit. Six months after the beginning of his chairmanship, the President of the Delegation portrayed himself as “*passionate*” about Europe. By name-dropping top-ranking politicians, he also depicted himself as an MP who tended to be part of the great of Europe.

Lequiller: “*Yesterday, I received monsieur Prodi, president of the Commission. A week ago, I received monsieur Delors. We had in-depth discussions together. I have received many European commissioners, many European ministers, many.... And of course French ministers: monsieur de Villepin, madame Lenoir... Monsieur Gaynard, we heard him just three days ago on agricultural matters*”²⁷.

The frequency of names dropped by Lequiller stands in contrast with the interviews given by other chairs. Hood and Pandraud did not mention many politicians apart from members of their committee. Connarty talked of an impersonal “government”. Barrau called the ministers by their first name whereas Lequiller sometimes used a very formal “Monsieur” and “Madame”.

Lequiller: “*As Europe is so important, you have access on a daily basis to people such as Raffarin, Villepin, Lenoir, Juppé, Barrot*”²⁸. *Europe is so important that we*

²⁷ At that time, Dominique de Villepin was Foreign Affairs Minister, Noëlle Lenoir was Deputy Minister for European Affairs and Hervé Gaynard Minister for Agriculture.

²⁸ Jean-Pierre Raffarin was Prime Minister, Alain Juppé was President of the UMP and Jacques Barrot chaired the UMP parliamentary group of the National Assembly.

work with fascinating people, and even at the international level, at the Convention. At the Convention, I am almost the only one not to have been a minister. They all are former Prime Ministers, Foreign Affairs Ministers etcetera. And so the level of discussion is absolutely wonderful”.

Lequiller succeeded Barrau as representative to the National Assembly of the Convention on the Future of Europe in 2002 and 2003. The experience certainly impressed him since he then got into the habit of presenting himself very often with the un-common French word of “*conventionnel*” (that is a Convention member) and after as “a former *conventionnel*”. He proposed in vain to prolong the Convention by some months. Within it, he promoted the “single presidency”, an original idea to create a common chair for the Commission and the Council. He did his utmost to defend that idea, meeting all sorts of people, drafting editorials in newspapers and signing a report for the Schuman Foundation. In the introduction to this report – whose personal tone contrasted with the style of the document as a whole – he explained how he enjoyed meeting famous leaders with very similar words to those he used during the interview: “When turning over the pages of the organigram I realize even more the significance of this assembly [the Convention]: how many prestigious names, how many Prime Ministers and ministers, commissioners and famous parliamentarians there were...” (Lequiller, 2003: 8).

More generally, and without reducing the analysis to only that dimension, Lequiller’s behaviour during the Convention can be analysed through his psychological profile. He did not miss any plenary sessions. A civil servant explains: “*For him, it was sacred*”²⁹. He attended meetings of the working groups, of the party groups or of the components of the Convention less frequently whereas all those structures can be regarded as more crucial (Deloche-Gaudez 2007). In contrast to his assiduity at the Convention, his attendance at the half-yearly meetings of the COSAC has been very irregular, unlike his counterparts in the Senate or at Westminster. Of course, it is clear that attending COSAC is, as a rule, not anywhere near as prestigious as attending the Convention. During the Convention, the promotion of a single presidency, an original and simple idea, ensured that he was quickly identified among the hundred members. He met some top-ranking leaders in order to sell his idea, such as, for instance, R. Prodi for one hour and a half. Lastly, concerned by the independence of the Convention members, Lequiller did not involve his committee in the

²⁹ Interview the 6th of August 2003, Paris.

drafting of the constitutional treaty. A clerk from the Delegation explains: “*It was important for Lequiller not to have any debate with the Delegation about the Convention*”³⁰.

Apart from the opportunity to attend the Convention, itself an exceptional event, chairing the Delegation gives rise to numerous occasions to rub shoulders with the great and powerful. The chair remains close to European leaders not only through the activities of the Committee – and notably the hearings – but also because of greater access to prestigious titles and positions. The list is long as concerns Lequiller: Vice-President of the PPE, member of the board of the European Movement – France, member of the political board of the UMP. Chairing the Delegation thus paves the way for party, electoral, international and even para-diplomatic activities. From 2002 to 2004, Lequiller was the UMP spokesperson for European issues. In March 2003, during the invasion of Irak, Jean-Pierre Raffarin and Alain Juppé asked him to reinitiate contacts with MPs from pro-invasion countries. In 2004, he led the UMP electoral campaign for the European elections. In March 2006, he sharply opposed his substitution as Vice-President of the PPE in favour of M. Barnier and was the first to be allowed to participate in the half-yearly submit of the right wing European federation of parties despite his eviction.

The shift of the Dr Europe role towards the status seeker profile has led to emphasis being placed on some aspects of the Delegation and to the development of new European activities within the French Parliament. Comprehensive scrutiny of European legislative projects has continued but it is no longer a priority as indicated by the decrease in the mean number of resolutions enacted each year by the Assembly: 19.7 for the period 1994-1996, 10.5 for 1998-2001, 8.7 for 2003-2006³¹. Symposia, which were so numerous when Barrau was chairing are no longer organized. On the other hand, hearings are still frequent. Above all, Lequiller has used the fact that he is a member of the decision-making board of the Conference of Presidents within the Assembly, in order to obtain the creation of new procedures and events. When he took over as chair in 2002, he tried to give the name of “committee” to the Delegation for Europe. For that purpose, he accepted that a European standing committee would not have as much power as the six existing committees³². He eventually failed due to the determined opposition of the chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Some top-ranking European leaders – José Manuel Barroso, Tony Blair, José Luis Zapatero, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing – have been allowed to take the floor at the

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ The years of general elections have not been taken into account since parliamentary activity is then reduced.

³² Since France’s Constitution limits the number of standing committees to six.

Assembly. Contrary to convention, their speeches were followed by a parliamentary debate during which the chair of the Delegation was one of the first orators to speak. A session of oral questions related to European issues is organised each first Wednesday of each month. A member of the cabinet is heard before each European Council. Lequiller regrets that on this occasion the Prime Minister is “usually unfortunately represented by the Foreign Affairs Minister which reduces the solemn and symbolic value of that hearing” (Goulard, Lequiller, Quartermer, 2007: 15)³³. In July 2005, in a note to the President of the Assembly, Lequiller suggested asking Channel 3 (State) television to cover the debate on the floor of the house, before and after each European Council. Media coverage of European affairs in general and of the parliament’s European activities in particular has thus constituted a recurrent theme of Lequiller’s chairmanship. Indeed, for a short time, he employed a personal assistant to deal with relations with the media. In addition to reports by the Delegation, he also published a defence plea of the constitutional treaty during the French referendum of 2005 (Lequiller, 2005) and a project for a new treaty in 2007 (Lequiller, 2007). Without wishing to contest Lequiller’s claimed passion for Europe, it would appear that the activities developed during his time as chair tend to favour the presence of top-ranking personalities and the holding of events according to their media potential. His interpretation of the European specialist thus tends to lean towards the former role of status seeker under the Europeanised shape of *The One who rubs shoulders with the Great and Powerful*.

In conclusion, Table 2 proposes a synthetic presentation of the details of each role adopted by the EU committees chairs. This synthesis makes clear that a part of the previous repertoire of roles has evolved within both assemblies. Existing roles have recycled new procedures and structures created for participating in EU affairs. But, in so doing, they have tended to change. By specifying in each case, the vision of Europe, the conception of the place for national legislatures within the EU and the privileged parliamentary tools, the table indicates that these changes are not neutral. Role orientations of the chairs eventually influence the European activities of the Houses as well as the ways Europe and the European “roles” for national legislatures are perceived.

³³ Quotation from a debate organised by the governmental *Centre d’analyse stratégique* in which Lequiller was seemingly invited as a specialist of media coverage of European affairs.

Table 2. The motivations, incentives, conceptions and tools associated with the four roles played by EU committees chairs

| (Sub)Role | Motivation | Emotional incentive³⁴ | Vision of Europe | European role of the parliament | Parliamentary tools |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------------------|---|-------------------------|--|---|
| The Chair | To chair a parliamentary committee | Game | A challenge | To adopt common positions | Reports, motions, hearings |
| The Club Member | To meet people | Conviviality | Friends | To voice public debate about Europe | Symposia, workshops, hearings |
| The Inquisitor | To restore the Truth | Obligation | A democratic deficit | To scrutinize the government on Europe | Reports, hearings, oral questions |
| The One who rubs shoulders ... | To meet important people | Status | A VIP club | To be heard by top European leaders | Para-diplomacy, Convention, edition, hearings |

The example of the EU chairs has helped to consider not only the contributions of roles to incremental institutional changes but also the distinction between motivational approaches and rational choice theory, and the greater relevance of the former. MPs mobilised on European issues tend to maximise their psychological incentive, framed by pre-existing roles, rather than to apply rational strategies, framed by pre-existing goals. Of course, on many cases, distinguishing reason and pleasure is spurious. However, the two concepts suppose a different conception of time. When chairing their committee on a day-to-day basis, the studied MPs seek an immediate rather than postponed and calculated gratification. The question of why they can privilege the maximisation of their psychological needs over their middle-term goals seems intuitively linked with the dominant pattern of parliamentarism in Europe, and more precisely to the *delegation* of backbenchers' interests to party leaders.

References

- Abélès M. (2001), *Un ethnologue à l'Assemblée*, Paris, Poches Odile Jacob.
- Allen D. (2005), "The United Kingdom : A *Europeanized* Government in a *non-Europeanized* Polity", in Bulmer S., Lequesne C. (eds), *The Member States of the European Union*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 119-141.
- Auel K., Benz A. (2005), "The Politics of Adaptation: The Europeanisation of National Parliamentary Systems", *Journal of Legislative Studies*, vol. 11, n° 3/4, pp. 372-393.
- Bergman T. (2000), "The European Union as the next step of delegation and accountability", *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 37, n° 3, pp. 415-429.

³⁴ All those incentives have been identified by Payne and his colleagues (1986).

- Cain B.E., Ferejhon J.A., Fiorina M.P. (1987), *The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.
- Carter C. (2001), "The Parliament of the United Kingdom: From Supportive Scrutiny to Unleashed control?", in Maurer A., Wessels W. (eds), *National Parliaments on their Ways to Europe: Losers or Latecomers?*, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, pp. 395-423.
- Costa O., Rozenberg O. (to be published), "Parlementarisme", in Belot C., Magnette P., Saurugger S. (eds), *Science politique de l'intégration européenne*, Paris, Economica.
- Cygan A. (1998), *The United Kingdom Parliament and European Union Legislation*, The Hague, Kluwer Law International.
- Cygan A. (2007a), "EU Affairs before the United Kingdom Parliament: A Case of Scrutiny as Substitute Sovereignty?", in Tans O., Zoethout C., Peters J. (eds), *National Parliaments and European Democracy*, Groningen, Europea Law Publishing, pp. 73-96.
- Cygan A. (2007b), "Scrutiny of EU legislation in the UK parliament: the first thirty years... and beyond?", in O'Brennan J., Raunio T. (eds), *National Parliaments within the Enlarged European Union : From victims of integration to competitive actors ?*, Abingdon, Routledge, pp. 163-177.
- Deloche-Gaudez F. (2007), "La convention européenne sur l'avenir de l'Europe: ruptures et continuités", in Amato G., Bribosia H., De Witte, B. (eds), *Genesis and Destiny of the European Constitution*, Brussels, Bruylant, pp. 47-85.
- Döring H. (1995), "Time as a Scarce Resource: Government Control of the Agenda", in Döring H. (ed.), *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Frankfurt, Campus Verlag / New York, St. Martin Press, pp. 223-246.
- Eymeri J.-M. (2002), « Définir "la position de la France" dans l'Union européenne. La médiation interministérielle des généralistes du SGCI », in Nay O., Smith A. (eds), *Le gouvernement de compromis. Courtiers et généralistes dans l'action politique*, Paris, Economica, pp. 149-176.
- Fenno R.F. (1978), *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts*, Boston, Little Brown.
- Forster A., Blair A. (2002), *The Making of Britain's European Foreign Policy*, London, Longman.
- Giddens A. (1979), *Central Problems in Social Theory*, London, MacMillan.
- Goulard S., Lequiller P., Quartermer J. (2007), "Information sur l'Europe en France : Crise de l'offre, crise de la demande ?", *Horizons stratégiques*, n° 6, pp. 13-31.
- Hochedez D., Patriarche V. (1998), *L'Assemblée nationale et l'Union européenne*, Paris, éd. de l'Assemblée nationale.
- Huber J.D. (1996), *Rationalizing Parliament, Legislative institutions and party politics in France*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Kassim H. (2005), "The Europeanization of Member State Institutions", in Bulmer S., Lequesne C. (eds), *The Member States of the European Union*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 285-316.
- Krehbiel K. (1991), *Information and Legislative Organization*, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press.

- Lequiller P. (1994), *L'Europe se lève à l'Est*, Monaco, ed. du Rocher.
- Lequiller P. (2003), *Un Président pour l'Europe*, Paris, Note de la Fondation Robert Schuman, n° 12, 2003.
- Lequiller P. (2005), *Correspondance européenne avec 25 jeunes de l'Union. Une approche facile de la Constitution*, Paris, ed. Lignes de repères.
- Lequiller P. (2007), *Europe, comment sortir de l'impasse ? Un traité institutionnel pour l'Europe*, Paris, Note de la Fondation Robert Schuman, n° 39.
- Lijphart A. (1999), *Patterns of democracy*, New Haven, Yale University Press.
- Matthews D. (1960), *U.S. Senators and Their World*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press.
- Maurer A., Mittag J., Wessels W. (2003), "National Systems' Adaptation to EU System: Trends, Offers, and Constraints", in Kohler-Koch B. (ed.), *Linking EU and National Governance*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 53-82.
- Maurer A., Wessels W. (2001), "National parliaments after Amsterdam: From Slow Adapters to National Players ?", in Maurer A., Wessels W. (eds), *National Parliaments on their Ways to Europe: Losers or Latecomers?*, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, pp. 425-476.
- Norton P. (ed.) (1998), *Parliaments and Governments in Western Europe*, London, Frank Cass.
- Nuttens J.-D. (2001), *Le Parlement français et l'Europe: l'article 88-4 de la Constitution*, Paris, LGDJ.
- O'Brennan J., Raunio T. (eds) (2007), *National Parliaments within the Enlarged European Union : From victims of integration to competitive actors ?*, Abingdon, Routledge.
- Payne J., Woshinsky O., Veblen E., Coogan W., Bigler G. (1986), *Motivation of Politicians*, Chicago, Nelson-Hall, 2nd ed.
- Pitkin H., (1967) *The Concept of Representation*, Berkley, University of California Press.
- Raunio T. (2005), "Holding Governments Accountable in European Affairs: Explaining Cross-National Variation", *Journal of Legislative Studies*, vol. 11, n° 3/4, pp. 319-342.
- Raunio T., Hix S. (2000), "Backbenchers Learn to Fight Back: European Integration and Parliamentary Government", *West European Politics*, vol. 23, n° 4, pp. 142-168.
- Raunio T., Wiberg M. (2000), "Does Support Lead to Ignorance? National Parliaments and the Legitimacy of EU Governance", *Acta Politica*, vol. 35, n° 2, pp. 146-168.
- Rozenberg O. (2006), "L'Union européenne et le fonctionnement des pouvoirs publics", *Les Cahiers français*, n° 332, pp. 39-45.
- Saalfeld T. (2005), "Deliberate Delegation or Abdication? Government Backbenchers, Ministers and European Union Legislation", *Journal of Legislative Studies*, vol. 11, n° 3/4, pp. 343-371.
- Saalfeld T., Müller W.C. (1997), « Roles in Legislative Studies : A Theoretical Introduction », in Saalfeld T., Müller W.C. (eds), *MPs in Western Europe*, London, Cass, pp. 1-15.
- Saulnier E. (2002), *La participation des parlements français et britannique aux communautés et à l'Union européenne*, Paris, LGDJ.

- Searing D. (1991), "Roles, Rules, and Rationality in the New Institutionalism", *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 85, n° 4, pp. 1239-1260.
- Searing D. (1994), *Westminster's World. Understanding Political Roles*, Cambridge MA, Harvard University.
- Séguin P. (2003), *Itinéraire dans la France d'en bas, d'en haut et d'ailleurs*, Paris, Seuil.
- Sprungk C. (2007), "The French Assemblée Nationale and the German Bundestag in the European Union: towards convergence in the 'old' Europe?", in O'Brennan J., Raunio T. (eds), *National Parliaments within the Enlarged European Union : From victims of integration to competitive actors ?*, Abingdon, Routledge, pp. 132-162.
- Strøm K. (1997), « Rules, Reasons and Routines: Legislative Roles in Parliamentary Democracies », in Saalfeld T., Müller W.C. (eds), *MPs in Western Europe*, London, Cass, pp. 155-174.
- Szukala A., Rozenberg O. (2001), "The French Parliament and the EU: Progressive Assertion and Strategic Investment", in Maurer A., Wessels W. (eds), *National Parliaments on their Ways to Europe: Losers or Latecomers?*, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, pp. 223-250.
- Tans O., Zoethout C., Peters J. (eds) (2007), *National Parliaments and European Democracy*, Groningen, Europa Law Publishing.
- Turner R.H. (1992), "Role: Sociological Aspects", in Sills D.L. (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Sociology*, New York, MacMillan, vol. 3.
- Tsebelis G. (2002), *Veto players: how political institutions work*, Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press.
- Wahle J., Eulau H., Buchanan W., Ferguson L. (1962), *The Legislative System. Exploration in Legislative Behavior*, New York, Wiley.
- Waller R., Criddle B. (1999), *The Almanac of British politics*, London, Routledge, 6th ed.
- Waller R., Criddle B. (2002), *The Almanac of British politics*, London, Routledge, 7th ed.
- Waller R., Criddle B. (2007), *The Almanac of British politics*, London, Routledge, 8th ed.
- Wessels B. (2005), "Roles and Orientations of Members of Parliament in the EU Context: Congruence or Difference? Europeanisation or Not?", *Journal of Legislative Studies*, vol. 11, n° 3/4, pp. 446-465.
- Woldendorp J., Keman H., Budge I. (2000), *Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945-1998)*, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers.

The Emotional Europeanisation of National Parliaments: Roles played by EU committee chairs at the Commons and at the French National Assembly. Article · November 2012 with 9 Reads. The EU has brought about new constraints and new prerogatives for national parliaments¹. Some procedures and structures have been created in order to cope with the loss of control of national parliaments over the European legislative process (O'Brennan, Raunio, 2007; Tans, Zoethout, Peters, 2007; Costa, Rozenberg, 2008). All over Europe, national chambers have notably created EU committees in charge of sifting through and of scrutinising community projects on legislation and on the monitoring of their government's European policy (...). Do you want to read the rest of this article? The Gatekeepers of European Integration? The Functions of National Parliaments in the EU Political System. Tapio Raunio. 2011. View 3 excerpts. Highly influential. What's on the path? Path dependence, organizational diversity and the problem of institutional change in the US economy, 1900-1950. Marc Schneiberg. 2007. Rationality, Institutions and Reflexivity in the EU: Some Ontological and Epistemological Considerations™, Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions. N. Kauppi. Rennes 14-16 April