

Von Arnim, Didymus, and Augustus: Three Notes on the Intention of *Doxography C*

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1

In defense of von Arnim on the Theophrastean origin of the first sections of the
Doxography

Let me begin with a longish quotation from the relevant parts of von Arnim's discussion of Arius Didymus' *Doxography* or *Epitome* (translations from the German are my own):¹

(Pages 4-6) Before I examine the individual evidence for the prevailing view, which leads to seeing in Arius only a witness for the eclecticism of Antiochus, not at all for the doctrine of the Peripatetics, or at most (if we follow the more moderate view of Diels and Meurer) for the doctrine of the latest Peripatetics, wholly sickened in addition by Stoicizing eclecticism, I would like to stress that the procedure of Arius, as it is presented in accordance with the prevailing view, is a striking and barely comprehensible one. He who devoted a special book in a doxographical work to Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic philosophy, obviously does not proceed from the point of view, represented by Antiochus, that these three systems of philosophy agree in the fact of the matter (apart from secondary points) and differ only in manner of expression. Had Arius endorsed the tendency of Antiochus, which emphasizes the commonality of the three systems sprung from the Socratic, he would hardly have chosen this form, which was bound to lead to the presentation three times in three separate books of essentially the same philosophy. This form was better suited to developing the inner coherence of each system and the distinctness of its doctrines. Arius Didymus confessed himself an adherent of the Stoic sect, as the index of Stoics in *cod. Laur.* 69, 35 of Diogenes Laertius shows. If, as an eclectic Stoic, he did hold close to the standpoint of Antiochus, this should have shown itself above all in his outline of Stoic ethics. That this is not the case, that rather only the theory of the old Stoics and not of Panaetius and Posidonius is taken by him into account, is well known. Is it really credible that he would have placed the old Stoic doctrine side by side with the later Academic doctrine of Antiochus and with the later Peripatetic doctrine of Stoicizing Peripatetics? The only section we still have of his book *On the Opinions of Plato* (*Dox. Gr.* p. 447) does not give this impression; the opening words, "How he dealt with the Ideas", show already that the author is claiming to give Plato's own teaching. Antiochus as an Academic, precisely because he maintained the identity of the Peripatetic teaching with the Academic, could not be held by Arius to be a classical witness for the Peripatetic doctrine, which he

¹ Von Arnim (1926). In writing 'Arius Didymus' I follow the scholarly view that the Didymus in question is the Arius Didymus who was court philosopher to the emperor Augustus. Von Arnim adopts this view.

(Arius) wanted to present in a special book of his *Epitome* as different from the Academic. Hardly could such a fraud by his court philosopher have been kept hidden from the Emperor Augustus. In a Peripatetic school that had been returned by Andronicus to the study of its chief leader [Aristotle] there must have been many men in Augustus' time who knew what was set down in Aristotle's and Theophrastus' own writings. Arius would hardly have dared then to construct his portrayal of Peripatetic philosophy from a non-Peripatetic source.

This argument of von Arnim's constitutes a very strong case for the claim that the alleged Stoicism in the first few pages of the *Epitome* (4-11, 118-124) is apparent only and in fact reflects the teaching of Theophrastus, which teaching may well have been elaborated in opposition to early Stoic teachings and with adoption of Stoic terms, but which would nevertheless count as genuinely Peripatetic and not at all as Stoic. The opinion of Annas,² that this development is due, not to Theophrastus but to much later Peripatetics, depends on rejecting von Arnim's argument in favor of the view, argued and defended at length by Pohlenz,³ that the ancient evidence makes the Stoics and not Theophrastus the origin of the *oikeiôsis* theory. The problem here is twofold: first, to show that Pohlenz's claim that the *oikeiôsis* theory is distinctively Stoic is not compatible with Theophrastus being the Peripatetic who elaborated a Peripatetic *oikeiôsis* theory in answer in part to the Stoics; second, to identify who these later Peripatetics were. The first point would seem impossible to show, since either account (that Theophrastus did or that he did not develop the Peripatetic *oikeiôsis* theory) seems compatible with Pohlenz' evidence.⁴ The second point is harder, for, as von Arnim argues, there are no such later Peripatetics who can plausibly be identified.

(Pages 6-7) *De Finibus V* contains no complete presentation of the entire Peripatetic ethics, but only the chapter about affinity (*oikeiôsis*) and the highest end in life; and Cicero found in his source (i.e. in Antiochus himself) the claim that Aristotle and Polemo agreed in this teaching (*De Finibus V* 14). He found there also Antiochus' overview of the history of the Peripatetic school, which must have made clear why Antiochus saw only Aristotle and Theophrastus as authoritative in matters of Peripatetic teaching, and took only them for the basis of his own presentation, repeated by Cicero, of the Peripatetic teaching on the highest good. For the exposition in §§ 13, 14 can have no other purpose in this context, since in it all the scholarchs of the Peripatos after Theophrastus are numbered off in turn and each one blamed individually and set to one side. The authoritative guardians of the school doctrine are, for Antiochus, only the ancients, the "leaders of the sect", and only Aristotle and Theophrastus count as such for the Peripatos in his eyes: "Let us then be content with these. For those

² Annas (1990): 80-96.

³ Pohlenz (1940).

⁴ Pohlenz tried mainly to show that the teaching about *oikeiôsis* in Arius' *Epitome* of Peripatetic ethics makes best sense if it is seen as derivative from Stoic teaching (1940) 13, 26-43. His arguments are powerful but not simply compelling (what Arius says could be derivative from both the Stoics and Theophrastus if Theophrastus was deliberately using Stoic terms in his defense of Peripatetic ethics against Stoic polemic). Pohlenz, however, does not directly confront the counter-arguments of von Arnim quoted here.

after them are better indeed than the philosophers of other schools, but they are so untrue to type that they seem to have given birth to themselves.”

...what we get to know from Cicero is only a presentation, constructed from Aristotle and Theophrastus, of the doctrine of the highest good, from which Antiochus gets the proof that it agrees with that of Polemo. It is clear, therefore, that the assumption that Arius constructed his outline from a doxographical presentation of Antiochus as we get to know it in the 5th book of *De Finibus* cannot achieve what it is supposed to achieve for the representatives of the prevailing view, namely to explain why the outline of Arius has absorbed into itself, not only drops, but whole streams of Stoic doctrine... Antiochus, however, as is clear from *De Finibus* V 12-14, had confined himself in his doxographical presentation, which so closely follows Arius' outline, to Aristotle and Theophrastus...

This argument of von Arnim's has not, I think, been given the weight it is due. Perhaps it can be answered, but if so only by probabilities and conjectures on the other side. No definite refutation of it, not even by Pohlenz, seems forthcoming. So Von Arnim's thesis must be allowed still to stand that Theophrastus could have been the Peripatetic who showed how the *oikeiōsis* theory was fully compatible with, indeed in a sense resulted from, Peripatetic premises. I take it then that von Arnim's case has not been shown to be plainly false nor Annas' plainly true. Either can indeed be allowed to stand, so the case for Theophrastus cannot be ruled out as Annas and other scholars she refers to are inclined to think. In fact Görgemanns, in a nice summary of the scholarly debate,⁵ seems to side with Giusta,⁶ and is inclined to think that a lot of Arius' material, if not all, does go back to Theophrastus, or even that Theophrastus developed the *oikeiōsis* theme in part in response to and in concert with parallel developments in Stoicism. But I make this point primarily for dialectical purposes. If truth be told, we are probably not in a position to reach a definite decision on the question. Just let us not rule out von Arnim.

2

How Arius Didymus Organized his Peripatetic Materials

David Hahn⁷ points out the somewhat disorganized state of the *Epitome* (for both the Stoics and the Peripatetics). A not dissimilar claim has been made specifically for the section on Aristotle's *Politics* by Nagle,⁸ although Nagle is inclined to think that Arius tried to produce, and to some extent succeeded in producing, a harmonious whole made up of not altogether harmonious materials. My main reason here for broaching this subject concerns a thesis about the order of books of the *Politics* which, in company in particular with Newman (though not in fact original to him),⁹ I have myself also

⁵ Görgemanns, "Oikeiōsis in Arius Didymus," in Fortenbaugh (1983) 166-168.

⁶ Giusta (1964-1967)

⁷ Hahn in Fortenbaugh (1983) 15-37.

⁸ Nagle (2002) 198-223.

⁹ Simpson (1997) xvii-xx.

defended, namely that the MSS Books Seven and Eight should come between Books Three and Four. This view is probably the minority view and one argument against it sometimes given is that Arius seems to have read the *Politics* with Books Seven and Eight at the end as the MSS have them. My contention will be that, because of the way Arius constructed his *Epitome*, we cannot reliably use it as a guide to the order in which he read the books of the *Politics*. Hence Newman's thesis can emerge unscathed at least from this line of attack.

My comments will begin with the way Arius has arranged the material on ethics, since we can see better from this arrangement how he generally proceeded. The *Politics* material can then be seen to follow a similar pattern.

Hahm¹⁰ has done some good examination of the ethics material and has plausibly concluded that the division of it, despite a seeming lack of order, does in fact follow an order, that of comparative evaluation of all the constituents of the moral universe, following in this the order of division given earlier in the Stoic *Epitome*. Hahm suggests that the ordering was original to Arius. The thesis is, as I say, certainly plausible and gives some unity to what otherwise seems rather disparate. But whether the order is that suggested by Hahm, or there is no order as others suggest, the order, or lack thereof, is not that of any of the Aristotelian *Ethics* as they have come down to us. A quick summary of the contents will reveal the fact:

1. 1 Ts, 116.19-118.4 Wachs
Characterization of ethics as derived from custom, about the rational and irrational parts of the soul, of which only the latter is here said to be receptive of virtue, though later it is said briefly that virtues come about in both the rational and irrational part [as is also said briefly in *MM*]
2. 1, 118.5-10
Sources of virtue: nature, custom, reason [from *EN* book 10]; man midway between god and beasts
3. 1-6, 118.11-124.18
Extensive discussion of *oikeiōsis* material and the preferable, with discussion of friendship and virtuous friendship [natural sequence as to subject matter, not as to form of treatment in *EN* and *EE*].
4. 6-9, 124.18-128.11
That the three kinds of goods, those of the body, those of the soul, those external, have an analogy to each other, even though they differ, and the goods of the soul are to be preferred. Political, communal, contemplative deeds. Definition of happiness. The bad go wrong
5. 10, 128.11-128.27
About virtue in general and the contrast with continence
6. 11, 128.27-129.19
About things to prefer and things to avoid
7. 12, 129.19-130.15
The sources of happiness – beauty, activity
8. 13-14, 130.15-134.8

¹⁰ Hahm in Fortenbaugh (1983) 20-26. See also Nagle (2002)

- How many parts of good there are, and about the target. Definition of happiness, again, and explained as to its parts; the saying of Solon as to completeness; middling life that is neither happy nor unhappy; vice self-sufficient for misery, and good luck harms the vicious
9. 15, 134.8-137.14
In how many ways the good is said [mainly from *MM*]
 10. 16-19, 137.14-142.15
About moral virtue, that it is a mean (with division of rational and irrational parts of soul that does not give rise to express distinction into moral and intellectual virtues but the moral virtues are called moral and to these the mean applies), that it concerns pleasure and pain, division of powers and passions and habits; division of virtues according to Theophrastus and *EE*; prudence in relation to virtue
 11. 20-21, 142.15-143.2
About passions of soul [not found in Aristotle, but in Theophrastus?]
 12. 21, 143.2-143.18
About friendship [four differences; not according to Aristotle, but Theophrastus?]
 13. 22, 143.18-143.24
About Favor
 14. 23, 143.24-145.11
Ways of life; theoretical life prior
 15. 24, 145.11-147.25
Run through of the virtues à la *MM* and some *VV* and some from elsewhere [Theophrastus?]; gentlemanliness

One thing worth noting about this material is that it borrows heavily from *MM*, more so in fact than from *EE* or *EN*, and that it includes some material and divisions that are not paralleled in extant Aristotelian sources. The facts have long been noted. Nevertheless, although Arius borrows heavily from *MM*, he does not adopt the ordering of topics that we find in *MM* (or that we find in *EE* and *EN*) but an ordering of his own. When we turn to the material on the *Politics* we find the same feature, namely that, despite appearances, it does not really follow the ordering of materials in that work but an ordering of Arius' own. Here then is a summary of the *Politics* material.

1. 26 Ts, 147.26-149.24, Wachs
An extensive section on the household, taken entirely from Book One of the *Politics*. But notice that there is nothing from the final two chapters about differences in virtue and about educating women and slaves in virtue.
2. There is nothing from Book Two on regimes considered by others to be best.
3. 27, 150.1-6
A section from Book One combined with sections from Book Three about the origin of the polis, and about the definition of citizenship and of city.
4. 27, 150.6-10
A section from Book Seven about the proper size of the city.
5. 27, 150.10-16

- A section from *EE* and *NE* about prudence and its divisions into economic, legislative, political etc.
6. 27, 150.17-23
A section from Book Three about the kinds of regimes and the difference between correct and deviant ones [save that democracy is the word Arius uses for what Aristotle calls polity and ochlocracy the word he uses for what Aristotle calls democracy. Note too that there is nothing about the division in detail, about ostracism, or about kingship and education from the last chapters of book three.]
 7. 27, 150.23-151.1
A section from Book Four about a best regime that is mixed from the correct ones. [But the characterization is misleading, since Aristotle's mixed regime is not from the correct regimes but from deviant ones, namely from oligarchy and democracy, and is itself one of the correct regimes, namely polity. Arius' characterization reflects rather what Aristotle says some say about the Spartan regime in Book Two, 6.1265b33-40 and what Polybius later says about the mixed regime. And what Theophrastus said?]
 8. 27, 151.2-3
A section from Book Five about regimes changing to the better or the worse.
 9. 27, 151.3-5
A section from Book Three and also from Book Seven [especially ch.13] that the regime thoroughly adorned with virtue is best, the one with vice worst.
 10. 27, 151.5-8
A section from Book Four, or its final chapters (chs.14-16), about differences between appointment of offices in democracies, oligarchies, and aristocracies. But there is nothing about the several sub-kinds of democracy or of oligarchy or of the reasons for these sub-kinds.
 11. 27, 151.9-15
A section from Book Five about the origins of faction [but only from the opening chapters; none of the particular details is included and nothing is said about tyranny.]
 12. 27, 151.16-22
A section from Book Six (ch.8) about the several kinds of offices there can be in regimes according to the kinds of regimes [but nothing from the earlier chapters of this book about how to set up democracies and oligarchies]
 13. 27, 151.23-24
A section from the beginning of Book Four (1.1289a3-4) about it being a politician's job to correct regimes as well as to found them...
 14. 27, 152.1-25
...followed immediately by extensive passages from Book Seven about the characteristics of the best regime, as regards people and place and procreation [as if these points are applicable to any regime and not to the best regime only]. But there is nothing from the first chapters of this Book about happiness and virtue and that the happy life is the virtuous life for both individual and city [unless we can suppose this point to be implied earlier in the discussion of ethics]

15. There is nothing at all from Book Eight [unless remarks in the previous section about the common education can be taken as a brief reference;¹¹ for these remarks contain, in particular, nothing about music, which however makes up the bulk of the book].

So we see that Arius starts with Book One, omits Book two, then combines Books One and Seven, then gives a passage from Book Seven, then a passage from the *Ethics*, then passages from Books Three and Four and Five in that order, then a passage combining books Three and Seven, then passages from Books Four and Five and Six in that order, then a passage from Book Four, then passages from Book Seven, with Book Eight being entirely (or almost entirely) omitted. In other words, whatever order Arius is following in arranging his material, it is not the order of the *Politics* itself.

Brendan Nagle¹² has given an extensive analysis of this part of the *Epitome* that further supports the same claim. He has noted a certain lack of thematic unity, or rather the presence of a certain thematic tension, in Arius' presentation. For if so, and if, as Nagle concedes, the *Politics* does have a thematic unity that Arius seems to lack, then whatever order Arius was following it was not, or not meant to be, the order of the material found in the *Politics* itself.

So on the basis of this evidence we may conclude that nothing definite can be deduced about the order in which Arius read the books of the *Politics*. Perhaps he read them in the MSS ordering as we now have it; perhaps he did not. We cannot say. Therefore, whatever Arius' *Epitome* shows, it does not provide evidence against Newman's thesis that the books of the *Politics* should be re-ordered to put Books Seven and Eight between Three and Four. A minor point, perhaps, but worth stressing nevertheless.

3

What Arius Didymus Included and what he Omitted in his *Epitome* and Why

More interesting than the previous question about the ordering of the *Politics* material by Arius is the question about the material itself. For Arius omits more than he includes and some of the material he includes is not entirely accurate to Aristotle's text. To begin with, then, something that has not been much noted about the ethical theory as presented by Arius is that it reflects, not just the content, but the orientation too of *MM* and not at all that of *EE* or *EN*. For in particular it downplays, as *MM* does but *EE* and *EN* do not, the so-called intellectual virtues. These virtues or some of them do appear in Arius and also in *MM*, but neither Arius nor *MM* refer to them as intellectual virtues (though Arius does say that there are two forms of virtue, rational and irrational; 1 Ts., 117.18-118.2 Wachs.). Why the difference? There is a view, adopted by a number of scholars,¹³ that *MM* is an exoteric or popular presentation by Aristotle of his ethical teaching. Popular opinion in Aristotle's day, even respectable popular opinion, seems to have had some

¹¹ A plausible suggestion by Schütrumpf in his paper for this volume.

¹² Nagle (2002).

¹³ For the details see Simpson (2014), Introduction, ix-xxviii.

suspicion of properly intellectual skills and abilities, associating them with sophistry and the worse kinds of rhetoric. To avoid raising such suspicions about his own ethical teaching Aristotle seems to have deliberately downplayed the intellectual virtues in *MM* while nevertheless obliquely hinting at them.¹⁴ Arius has done the same though he clearly knows of *EE* and *EN* and uses material from them in his *Epitome*. In other words, in presenting a summary of Peripatetic ethics that, precisely as a summary, would seem addressed to a wide and popular audience, he has judged that he should adopt the exoteric or popular orientation of *MM* and not the esoteric or school presentation of *EE* and *EN*. Those who know Aristotle's works could not miss the fact that Arius has followed *MM*'s procedure and not that of *EE* and *EN*. They would be alerted, then, even if others are not, to the possibility that Arius is being as coy as Aristotle was in *MM* about what he really thinks or is really doing.

Lest this claim seem extreme or unmotivated, consider the peculiarities of the *Epitome* of the *Politics* and in particular the things that are omitted and the things that are misrepresented. First, there is a brief mention but no full discussion of distributive justice as the basis for the division of regimes into correct and deviant. There is a brief statement that regimes are correct that aim at the common advantage and those base that aim at private advantage. There is also a statement a few lines later that the regime adorned with virtue is best and the one with vice worst. Aristotle's position is thus correctly but insufficiently described. For, according to Aristotle, only regimes ruled by the virtuous (either by the perfectly virtuous in kingship and aristocracy, or by those with military virtue in polity) aim at the common advantage (for virtue is the common advantage, and only the virtuous pursue virtue properly).

Second there is what is said about the mixed regime, namely that it is mixed from the correct regimes. These Arius has just listed as kingship, aristocracy, and democracy. But what Arius calls democracy Aristotle calls polity, and what Arius calls ochlocracy Aristotle calls democracy. Further, the mixed regime for Aristotle is already one of the correct regimes, for polity is this mixed regime. But polity is not mixed from the correct regimes. On the contrary it is mixed from democracy and oligarchy, and these are precisely not correct regimes. Admittedly Aristotle allows for varieties of polity, since he allows for oligarchically and democratically leaning polities, the former of which are among those labeled so-called aristocracies while the latter were indeed by the ancients called democracies (*Politics* 4.7, 13.1297b24-25). A so-called aristocracy is a mixed regime, and it counts for Aristotle as a correct regime, but it does not count as an instance of the correct regime Aristotle calls aristocracy. It counts as an instance of so-called aristocracy, which is a combination of virtue, or quasi-virtue, and oligarchy and democracy. It is more like polity than like aristocracy (4.7).

In short, taking all these points together, we can see that Arius is speaking and using terms in a way that is not at all Aristotle's and moreover in a way that makes Aristotle's theory of the mixed regime impossible to state – quite apart anyway from the fact that polity is for Aristotle more properly a middle regime, as founded on the middle, than a mixed regime, *Politics* 4.11.

Notice too that kingship or monarchy is not part of Aristotle's mixed regime although Arius writes as if it is. Aristotle allows indeed that kingship can exist in several regimes (including democracy) but as an office, or a perpetual generalship, and not as

¹⁴ For the details again see Simpson (2014), ix, xii, xxiii-xxiv, 133-35, 154-55, 163-65.

constitutive of the regime (*Politics* 3.16.1287a3-8). Monarchy as a regime exists only in kingship proper and in tyranny, which are the best and the worst regimes respectively. In no sense does kingship form part of the mixture that makes the mixed regime for Aristotle. Why then does Arius write in such a way as to confuse these points, or at least to make it very difficult if not impossible to state them?

Third there is what Arius does at 27 Ts., 151.23-24 Wachs. He begins, as noted there, with a section from *Politics* Book Four (1.1289a3-4), about it being a politician's job to correct regimes as well as to found them, and then he follows this section immediately with extensive passages from Book Seven about the characteristics of the best regime, as if these characteristics are appropriate to any regime (or to the reform of any regime) and not to the best regime only. The association is not in Aristotle, for the passage about correcting regimes is in the context of his discussion about regimes less than the best (4.1) and not of his discussion about the best regime (7 & 8). Perhaps Aristotle would not deny that one could establish a best regime by reform of some existing regime, but he does not present the material in that way. Why does Arius present it differently?

If we bring all these puzzles together, the following may be suggested. Aristotle's discussion of distributive justice or of the true ground for claims to rule (which Arius admits at least by the by) is revolutionary in character. For it implies that rule is only just when the virtuous rule and is unjust otherwise. Admittedly Aristotle softens the revolutionary implications by allowing that circumstances may be such that rule by the virtuous is hard or impossible so that one must accept a deviant regime instead. But a deviant regime, however unavoidable, is still deviant. Open discussion of distributive justice can be dangerous. Aristotle himself avoids talking of distributive justice in *MM*, which is not surprising if that text is an exoteric or popular one. He only talks of distributive justice in *EE*, *EN*, and then the *Politics*. Arius, who follows the caution of *MM* in his presentation of Peripatetic ethics, does the same in his presentation of Peripatetic politics. Of whom or what was he being cautious? The obvious answer, if the Didymus of the *Epitome* is Arius Didymus the court philosopher of Augustus, is that he was being cautious precisely of Augustus and of the Augustan settlement at Rome. Augustus wanted to restore moral virtue to Rome, but in doing so he implicitly admitted that Rome was not now virtuous. But if Rome is not now virtuous are the rulers, or all of them, virtuous? Is the Senate, who in theory share rule with the emperor, virtuous? Are the people, who also in theory share rule with the emperor, virtuous? If not, should they really share in rule? Should the emperor (if one supposes him virtuous – and Arius could hardly deny he was) rule alone? But for the emperor to rule alone, and to do so openly, would be to undermine the Augustan settlement, which was precisely to preserve Republican forms and at least some semblance of Republican rule under his own leadership.

This suggestion may be supported by what Arius says of the mixed regime. As already indicated Arius does not present Aristotle's theory of the mixed regime. Instead he presents – if only in the briefest of remarks – the theory that the mixed regime is a combination of kingship, aristocracy, and democracy. This theory recalls Polybius rather than Aristotle. Moreover it too neatly fits the Augustan settlement at Rome, which can surely be seen, and which Augustus himself surely saw, as a combination of kingship in the emperor, aristocracy in the senate, and democracy in the people and the army (always

fiercely loyal to the emperor). Moreover the emperor was not just military commander in chief but also a member of the senate and, as holder of Tribunician power, the chief representative of the people. Augustus' kind of kingship is thus indeed a sort of regime and not just an office or a perpetual generalship within a regime.

But why would Arius want to present Polybius in place of Aristotle as guide about the mixed regime? An obvious answer is that Arius can thus imply that Aristotle favored the Roman system of government as a mixture of the correct regimes. Of course Polybius was speaking of Republican Rome not Imperial Rome. But Imperial Rome for Augustus, as already remarked, was meant to be, at least in outward form, a continuation of Republican Rome (for all the old offices continued). The only difference was that one man, Augustus, possessed, and possessed for life, the power of the most important of these offices. Augustus was king in fact but not in name (he carefully changed the name to imperator, or military commander, but history has changed the meaning with the name, for emperor, derived from imperator, means precisely a supreme king).

Aristotle's political thought is thus subtly deprived of its revolutionary elements. For in accord with his exoteric practice Arius avoids saying very much about the principle of merit that should govern distributive justice (and that, in its open form, is an implicit critique, and so an implicit call to the reform or overthrow, of regimes that do not follow that principle). Also, by his subtle and devious presentation of the mixed regime, he presents Aristotle as favoring the Augustan settlement in Rome. Thus Arius downplays the disturbing character of Aristotle's discussion of politics by not revealing too openly, or at all, things that might negatively impact a popular and not a school audience. And since part of this audience was Augustus himself, whose court philosopher Arius was, we have Arius suitably nuancing his presentation to avoid giving Augustus any anxiety about allowing Aristotelian thought, including political thought, a free presence in the Empire. Perhaps Arius had that aim as one of his intentions: reveal what is safe, hide what might appear not to be, but not in such a way that readers of the original texts (would these include Augustus?) cannot see the difference and cannot note the prudence of maintaining Arius' qualifications and caution. The mixed regime of Aristotle, which Arius transmutes in subtle ways, into the mixed regime of Polybius, but without naming Polybius, becomes the Augustan settlement of the mixed regime of kingship, aristocracy, and democracy. Accordingly, anything about Aristotle's thought in the *Politics* that might be a threat to the Augustan settlement of the Empire is carefully excluded or nuanced away.¹⁵

So note further that Augustus' settlement at Rome was not the founding of a political system from scratch but the reforming or remaking of one that already existed. In implicit recognition of this fact Arius writes: "It is also a political man's job to correct a regime, which appears much harder than founding one..." (27 Ts., 151.23 Wachs.). But Aristotle himself does not say that it is "much harder" to correct a regime than to found one; he says that it is "no less a job" to correct one than to found one (4.1.1289a3-4). A slight enough change in words, perhaps, but a great one in effect on the hearer if the hearer was Augustus. The materials that Arius then immediately adds after this remark (27 Ts., 152.1-25 Wachs), and that he takes, not from the context of the remark in Aristotle but from the context of Aristotle's discussion of the simply best regime,

¹⁵ We know that Augustus revised the Sibylline books, removing and burning parts of them, Suetonius, *Life of Augustus* 31.1, quite possibly because he thought these parts subversive.

commend things that Augustus either did or wanted: the careful management of the population of the empire, the reform of morals or the concern with virtue and the beautiful, the importance of following ancient precedent, the role of religion, the protection of the borders of the empire, the education of the young.

It is not hard, then, to read Arius' misrepresentation of Aristotle's doctrine of the mixed regime and of reform and the best regime, as well as his putting together of material that Aristotle keeps apart, as deliberate rhetorical moves designed, first no doubt to flatter Augustus, but second to encourage and guide him, and third to secure his protection for philosophy. The flattery is obvious: Augustus and his rule are being likened to the best regime of one of the greatest of Greek philosophers, and a philosopher whose works had recently been brought out in a new edition corrected in the light of that philosopher's own recently discovered manuscripts (surely something for the Augustan age to glory in). The encouragement and guidance are no less obvious: the best regime is best because of its concern with virtue and good order and piety and education. If Augustus is to go on deserving praise, let him go on exercising the same concern. The protection of philosophy is now also clear. If the teaching of Aristotle is so favorable to Augustus' own position in Rome, to his settlement of the Roman empire, to his program of moral reform and careful imperial management, how can philosophy, and in particular the philosophy of Aristotle and the Peripatetics, not be something for the emperor to protect and promote?

Arius, however, has achieved these results through deviation and sleight of hand. He has not presented the Aristotelian doctrine whole and unexpurgated. What if Augustus or one of his friends or aides were to find out? But what would they find out? Difficult reflections on distributive justice whose precise meaning scholars still puzzle over even today; remarks about the mixed regime that are, because of Polybius (and others), so well known that Aristotle must have adopted them (and shifts can be made to show that he did) – or if he did not, his thinking must have been at fault and so he is rightly now corrected; remarks about reform that, first, are a pardonable exaggeration and, second, preface recommendations that no respectable or virtuous man (least of all the publicly moral Augustus) could possibly reject. So even if Augustus himself noted Arius' subtle changes, he could not object to them. Rather he would likely admire them. Arius is carefully sanitizing Aristotle so that the common opinion about Aristotle's thought (as promulgated by Arius himself in the *Epitome*) is no threat. But Arius is doing so in such a way that only careful scholars could notice the sanitization, and also in such a way that scholars who did notice it would notice also the prudence of Arius' procedure. They would thus be taught the prudence at the same time as they are taught the sanitization. Augustus was sane enough and subtle enough as a ruler not to be disturbed by scholars who, if they know subversive things, know also not to act on them.

So further and finally, if we return to the *oikeiōsis* material from the beginning of the *Epitome*, has not Arius thereby shown that Peripatetic philosophy falls fully into harmony with the Stoicism so much embraced by the Romans? Has he not shown how Stoic in the end Peripatetic philosophy really is? Peripatetics and Stoics are made to walk together in praising the *oikeiōsis* that binds all men with all men and so in particular binds

together, as Augustus wished, the disparate peoples of the Roman empire.¹⁶ The *oikeiôsis* doctrine, whatever its origin and whoever its author, is seen to be as compatible with Peripatetic philosophy as it is manifestly compatible with Stoic. What matter if Aristotle did not develop it *expressis verbis*? What matter if Theophrastus did? What matter if some later Peripatetic or even Arius himself developed it or elaborated it? Peripatetic philosophy is in any event brought fully within the scope of the Augustan agenda.

Perhaps, therefore, to recall the first section of this paper concerning von Arnim and the Theophrastean origin of the *oikeiôsis* doctrine in the *Epitome*, we should say that if Arius' aim in that *Epitome* was in part rhetorical and esoteric (to defend philosophy, Peripatetic and otherwise, by subtle changes and insinuations) the question of the origin of that doctrine has no answer – or at least it has no answer that can be derived, as von Arnim and others have wished to derive it, from Arius' intention. For if his intention was rhetorical and esoteric, any answer will do to the question about the source of *oikeiôsis* in the *Epitome*: Aristotle in some lost work, Theophrastus, later Peripatetic borrowings from the Stoics, Arius himself. Certainly, if Arius could be subtly misleading, and deliberately so as it seems, about the mixed regime (at least as it is found in Aristotle), and also about reforming regimes, he could be deliberately misleading elsewhere. Admittedly he would have to keep sufficiently close to Aristotle and Theophrastus that his *Epitome* remained recognizably Peripatetic (too great a departure from known truth would not be subtle). But it does remain recognizably Peripatetic (and all the more so if Theophrastus can be seen or implied to be the origin of *oikeiôsis* within Peripateticism). Arius has secured his double aim: to epitomize Peripatetic philosophy, and to defend that philosophy and its continuing study before the unchallengeable authority of the ruler of the Roman world. No mean feat.

¹⁶ That Arius wanted to present Peripatetic doctrine as favoring a certain cosmopolitan union among all peoples is argued by Nagle (2002), though Nagle also thinks that Arius thereby failed both to present Aristotle's teaching on the household correctly and to develop a cosmopolitanism that could actually work.

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Doxography is a term used especially for the works of classical historians, describing the points of view of past philosophers and scientists. The term was coined by the German classical scholar Hermann Alexander Diels. Haribhadra (8th century CE) was one of the leading proponents of *anekĀntavĀda*. He was the first classical author to write a doxography, a compendium of a variety of intellectual views. This attempted to contextualise Jain thoughts within the broad framework. It interacted with the many Arthur J. Pomeroy (ed.), Arius Didymus. *Epitome of Stoic Ethics*. The present volume offers a complete English translation of Stobaeus's excerpt of Stoic ethics with facing Greek text, a brief introduction and explanatory endnotes. As often recognized, the doctrine of *oikeiosis* is absent from the Stoic extract in Arius and, even though there seems to be an implicit reference to it (in 11k = p. 105, 26-27 W), the affinity or familiarity to virtue is there mentioned in connection with the gods, not humans. It is important to recall the seminal work on Arius Didymus and Peripatetic ethics by H. Von Arnim, *Arius Didymus's Abriss der peripatetischen Ethik*, Wien und Leipzig 1926, as well as that by P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*, Berlin-New York 1973 (especially pp. 259-443, vol.